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Introduction 
 
The present thesis is a discussion of a particular view of history. Namely the view set 
forth by the British historian Arnold Joseph Toynbee (1889-1975) in his monumental 
12-volume A Study of History, produced in the years 1934-61. The view is that the 
intelligible field of study for the historian is not nation-states nor individuals nor 
concepts or ideas, but entire civilizations which are born, grow, break down and 
disintegrate according to certain patterns and rules that can be observed from one 
civilization to another. According to this view, current Western Civilization is now 
living through a time very reminiscent of one experienced by the ancient Greeks and 
Romans some time in the 1st century before Christ. 
One of Toynbee’s crucial points is that during the beginning of a civilization’s 
growth it consists of a multitude of sovereign states that share the same overall 
culture, but are nevertheless politically independent. At a certain stage these states 
will begin to wage war on one another with an ever-increasing intensity and brutality. 
Toynbee calls this the Time of Troubles. At one point, the enmity and brutality of 
these wars become so extreme that the civilization breaks down under them, or to use 
Toynbee’s words: ’it inflicts mortal wounds upon itself’. The sense of unity that 
pervaded the civilization on a cultural and spiritual level disappears and can now only 
be recreated in a political form, a so-called Universal State, which unifies the entire 
geographical area of the civilization, and often beyond. 
The view is fascinating, not the least because of the supposed prophetic 
potential inherent in it, and Toynbee accordingly became one of the most famous 
historians of the 20th century. In 1947 he was on the front page of Time Magazine 
and that, together with the abridgement of his work by D. C. Somervell, was 
paramount in disseminating his ideas to the wider public. Americans in a Post-World 
War II world felt that Toynbee had an important message for them, and the 
abridgement alone sold way over 200,000 hard cover copies in the United States1; an 
unprecedented number for such a work. During the 1950’s Toynbee lectured 
routinely at several prestigious American universities and in 1957 he took an 18 
month long journey around the world, visiting archaeological sites and places he had 
written about in A Study. During this time he lectured at universities and met with 
                                                
1 McNeill, p. 215 plus note 30. 
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heads of states and other leading people of the time, which all together contributed to 
solidifying his status as global figure. 
However, popular as A Study of History was, criticism from academic circles 
was also mounting during the 1950’s. Specialists thought that Toynbee, attempting to 
generalize from historical events, chose only those events or aspects of them that 
supported his theory. Toynbee engaged willingly and enthusiastically in the 
discussion of his work, which eventually prompted him to write the 12th and last 
volume of A Study of History, titled Reconsiderations where, as the title says, he 
reconsidered many of his central tenets, conceded to several of his critics’ points and 
debated others. Reconsiderations and the mammoth work Hannibal’s Legacy which 
Toynbee also produced in the late 1950’s demonstrated to the academic community 
that he was more than just a prophet and poet as some had mockingly called him. He 
was indeed an eminent historian who knew his métier painstakingly well. According 
to Toynbee’s biographer William H. McNeill, however, a consequence of 
Reconsiderations was also that the unifying vision of history that had been presented 
in A Study lay somewhat shattered and Toynbee did not put the pieces back together. 
Due to this and no doubt also due to the general interest of academic historians 
shifting decisively away from world history during the 1960’s Toynbee’s work has 
been virtually absent in the academic debate since his death in 1975. 
What then is the purpose of bringing attention to it again? If it has been 
debated and found not to be consistent what more can there be to say? First of all, I 
do not believe that Toynbee’s system is entirely wrong-headed. As will be discussed 
further in chapter 1, much of the critique levelled against Toynbee aims at various 
smaller parts of his system and at his tendency to be too ambitious in formulating 
laws for the various aspects of the growth and decay of civilizations. And this is true, 
he does stretch his conclusions too far on several occasions. Yet having pondered the 
points of multiple critical essays, it seems to me that the greater structure of his 
system, the very idea of focusing on civilizations, the larger phases he attributes to 
their life, the idea of the Universal State, etc., do seem to remain largely intact. It 
could seem as if, although the wheels and pipes of his historical machine may have 
encountered some congestion, the factory surrounding it still stands.  
I should underline at this point that I deal only with the Graeco-Roman (or in 
Toynbee’s words the Hellenic) and the Western Civilizations. Toynbee attempts with 
his system to account for world history as a whole and so much of the fair critique 
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levelled against it – for instance of his account of Jewish history – is irrelevant in this 
context. In other words, much of that critique may be relevant and just, but it may not 
impinge on there being a recurring pattern in the Graeco-Roman and Western 
Civilizations. Even if the pattern of the Graeco-Roman Civilization did not occur in 
the history of any other civilization it might still occur in that of The West for the 
simple reason that the latter has been born out of the first and thus might be repeating 
some of its patterns. 
 
To specify the purpose of this thesis, it is as follows: 1) To discuss, with a basis in 
Toynbee’s system, to what extent there can be said to be a recurring pattern in the 
evolution of the Graeco-Roman and the Western Civilizations in order to qualify a 
discussion of the point of development of our civilization today, and 2) to discuss 
Toynbee’s system in the process and suggest some alternative conceptualizations of 
some of his key terms and some of the periods and processes he describes. In short, I 
attempt with this thesis to do something which as far as I know has not been done for 
a long time. I try to think along with Toynbee, taking into account some of the main 
points of criticism levelled against him, and to see if – with modifications and 
concessions – this can bring us somewhere interesting. 
 
In the first chapter I will look into some of the key factors – private and professional 
– in Toynbee’s life that not only shaped him as a person and an historian, but that also 
formed his views on the world and ultimately influenced his great work A Study of 
History. I will look especially at his relationship to Oswald Spengler and the change 
during his life towards a strongly religious view of history that I label his ‘religious 
turn’. I will look at some of the critique that has been levelled against A Study and 
mention a few other notable figures that have been inspired by and kept working with 
the perspective on history pioneered by Toynbee and Spengler. Finally, I will make 
some general considerations on a feasible way to approach Toynbee and his way of 
working with history. 
In chapter 2 I will outline the general course of development for a civilization 
according to Toynbee’s ’traditional’ model, the one based on the Hellenic 
civilization. After that I will exemplify the model by telling the stories of the Hellenic 
and the Western Civilizations, as they are presented by Toynbee. The task of 
summarizing anything that Toynbee has written invariably presents the person doing 
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the summery with a delicate problem. Toynbee is not always consistent in the way he 
uses even his most central concepts, they can be bend here and there, depending on 
the context, making the interpretation of his work a somewhat creative act. One has to 
exercise a good sense of judgment now and then. Moreover, A Study was written over 
a period of many years and Toynbee changed his mind on certain topics or added to 
them during his life. Add to that the fact that he produced an all-together 
insurmountable amount of text which makes getting an overview of his production 
and how his thought changed during his life an Heraclean achievement in itself. I 
must frankly confess that I have read far from everything that Toynbee wrote. I have 
concentrated primarily on relevant parts of the 12-volume Study, the two 
abridgements of it by D.C. Somervell, Toynbee’s own one-volume edition from 1972 
and Hellenism from 1959. These form the basis of the narrative in chapter 2. In a few 
places I qualify it by adding more recent data. 
In the account in chapter 2 I focus mainly on the pattern in the civilizations’ 
social and political development. Toynbee also speaks about patterns of development 
within the cultural sphere, such as vulgarization in the arts and language when the 
civilization begins to break down, but this is another large part of his system that 
unfortunately I do not have room delve into here. 
In chapter 3 I will look into some of the central concepts of Toynbee’s 
system, above all the concept of civilization. How are we to understand this term 
which is so key to his system? As it will show, Toynbee is by no means consistent in 
his usage of it. I aim to clarify his various uses of the term and suggest to understand 
the essence of a civilization to be what I call a shared cosmology: a meta-myth about 
the nature of the universe and of life which gives a common cultural platform to the 
members of the civilization. Such a cosmology is often embodied within a religion. I 
continue by discussing Toynbee’s notion of growth and attempt to give a more 
thorough and nuanced definition of the concept that is applicable both within and 
outside of Toynbee’s system. Finally, I find that his term Time of Troubles is quite 
illuminating as far as it goes, but that it seems to be part of a larger pattern including 
the civilization’s physical expansion through three successive waves. This I attempt 
to illustrate. This analysis suggests that Western Civilization is currently living 
through a time which is in some ways reminiscent of the Graeco-Roman Civilization 
in the beginning of the 1st century B.C. Chapter 3 is also the ‘philosophical’ part that 
distinguishes this work from a thesis of history. 
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One last thing what I wish to bring attention to before proceeding to the 
presentation of Toynbee’s work is my usage in the thesis of Toynbee’s terms the 
Hellenic Civilization and the Western Civilization. The Hellenic Civilization 
corresponds to what is normally meant by the Graeco-Roman Civilization, which 
reflects the notion – of which Toynbee is a main but by no means the only proponent 
– that Greek and Roman history have to be understood together. As I shall argue in 
chapter 3, if we attempt to understand a civilization as being essentially a shared 
cosmology, then it is indeed reasonable to treat these two societies under a common 
heading. In my opinion, this does not downplay the uniqueness of Rome, although 
Toynbee does that at some instances.2 Along with Toynbee, I also at times use the 
term ‘Hellenism’ as an abbreviation for the Hellenic Civilization.  
Regarding Western Civilization, Toynbee also refers to this as the Western 
Christian Civilization, Western Christendom, or simply The West. With this he 
means the feudal society that sprang out of a Roman Catholic religion and meta-
culture as a response to the general challenge of chaos in the medieval Dark Age and 
which developed from there onwards. In other words, according to him the Western 
Civilization begins around the 10th century A.D. This is important to keep in mind, 
as the term The West or Western Civilization can also be taken to mean the Western 
tradition as a whole, including everything back to the city-states in ancient Greece. In 
this thesis however, I use the term in Toynbee’s sense, although in chapter 3 I will 
argue for an expansion of what counts as being part of a civilization.  
 
 
Chapter 1: A Study of History – its context and reception 
 
How did such a massive work as A Study of History come into being? That is the 
question we will be looking into in this chapter. We will consider both the personal 
and professional factors plus the events of the larger society that shaped Toynbee and 
his view of history. Thereafter we will have a brief look at the tradition originating 
                                                
2 J. F. Leddy criticizes Toynbee for exactly this in his article ’Toynbee and the History of Rome’ from 
1957, and it is true that Toynbee especially in the first parts of A Study of History is not very 
sympathetic towards Rome’s achievement. However, in some of his later writings he speaks quite 
warmly about the peace and prosperity provided by the Universal State, as in Change and Habit: The 
Challenge of Our Time from 1966. 
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from Toynbee (and Spengler), some of the critique of Toynbee’s system, and a few 
preliminary reflections on how to approach Toynbee best. 
 
Biographical details and basis for A Study of History3 
 
Arnold Joseph Toynbee seemed from early on destined to become an historian. His 
uncle and namesake, Arnold Toynbee, had been an extremely influential economic 
historian in his short life who, among other things, coined the term ’industrial 
revolution’. Arnold J’s mother had been one of the first women to take exams in 
history at Cambridge University and came out with the best results of that year, and 
she passed her interest on to her son. During Toynbee’s teenage years his father’s 
career was faltering and he ultimately lost his mind in 1910 and spent the rest of his 
life in a mental institution, putting extra pressure on his son to achieve what his father 
had not. Thus, there were all-together great expectations and strong pressure on the 
young Toynbee.  
Toynbee did extremely well in school and won several prizes for the best 
papers. He also won scholarships for Winchester and later for Balliol College at 
Oxford, which was necessary since his family was struggling even to uphold a middle 
class standard. When Toynbee finished his exams at Balliol he took a year off, 
travelling Italy and Greece by foot, exploring the ancient sites and places he had read 
about during his school years. In 1911 he returned to teach ancient history at Balliol, 
and in 1914 married the daughter of Gilbert Murray, one of Toynbee’s old teachers 
and now a colleague at Balliol. During World War I Toynbee managed to eschew 
military service and instead did propaganda work for the British government, 
documenting the atrocities that the Turks, Germany’s allies, were committing against 
the Armenians. It was as an expert in Near-Eastern matters that Toynbee in 1919 
attended the Peace Conference as part of the British delegation. 
Toynbee’s participation in and disappointment with the results of the Peace 
Conference led him gradually towards what McIntire and Perry in Reappraisals call 
his second professional field4. The first was his firm basis in the classics as an ancient 
historian of Greece and Rome. The second became his acute interest in current 
                                                
3 Unless stated otherwise, biographical details about Toynbee is taken from McNeill’s thorough 
biography Toynbee: a life from 1989. 
4 McIntire, Reappraisals, p. 6. 
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international affairs. Due to a feeling of guilt that he had survived the war while so 
many of his friends and colleagues had died in the trenches and determined to do his 
utmost to avoid another war, Toynbee in 1927 commenced working for the Chatnam 
House, an independent institute with the aim of informing the public about current 
international affairs, with the exact purpose of avoiding another war being triggered 
by diplomatic blunders that no one in the public knew about. Thus from 1927 
onwards Chatnam House released an annual survey of international affairs, compiled 
and written primarily by Toynbee.  
These two fields, his firm basis in classical history and his strong 
preoccupation with international politics, together formed the basis of his third 
professional field: universal history and philosophy of history, which found its outlet 
in A Study of History. Toynbee commenced working on A Study from about 1929 and 
published the first three volumes in 1934. The next three came in 1939, two weeks 
before the beginning of World War II. During the war Toynbee was once again 
occupied with war work for the British government so it was not until 1954 that the 
last volumes of A Study appeared. Following intense debate and scholarly critique 
especially of the last four volumes, Toynbee wrote and published Reconsiderations in 
1961 which together with an historical atlas from 1959 completed A Study. 
It is interesting to note that Toynbee wrote A Study while he was working on 
the annual surveys for the Chatnam House. The surveys alone were a mammoth 
achievement and when Toynbee retired in 1955 no one could be found to replace 
him. As Stromberg observes in Reappraisals no such enterprise has ever existed 
since5. Toynbee himself thought that he could not have done one without the other, 
that A Study provided the necessary background for the understanding of current 
affairs, and conversely that constant analysis of current power politics gave him an 
insight into the workings of the past. 
 
Professional influences 
 
As should be evident from the above description of Toynbee’s first two professional 
fields he certainly was a man of facts, and consequently A Study is a study of history. 
But perhaps a more appropriate title would have been ’An Interpretation of History’ 
                                                
5 McIntire, Reappraisals, p. 141. 
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for at the same time it does not look quite like any other history book. It is rich in 
quotations from the Bible, mythic allegories and at times highly poetic 
representations of historical processes. Toynbee read widely and omnivorously and 
many different works gave him inspiration for A Study: When I travel I carry in my 
pocket a copy of the Bhagavad-Gita, a volume of Dante, an anthology of the 
metaphysical poets, and ’Faust’ – books I read over and over again. Some people live 
by Freud and ’Hamlet’. I live by Jung and ’Faust’.6 Toynbee also makes use of myth 
in the creation of his most central concept, Challenge and Response, which is 
probably the Toynbeean term that has entered most widely into the general 
vocabulary of historians7. He claimed that Plato taught him to make use of myth 
whenever he reached the land inaccessible to the intellect. 
Apart from these many rather metaphysical inspirations it is also possible to 
place a couple of more secular writers among Toynbee’s inspirations. Dr. Teggart 
was an Irish professor teaching at Berkeley who was one of the first to point to the 
fact that the origin of civilizations was not only to be found in the Near-East, but also 
in India and China. He exercised some influence on Toynbee. Regarding the tragic 
plot-structure that Toynbee imposed on the Hellenic Civilization, McNeill, Toynbee’s 
biographer, points to the ancient Greek historian Thucydides as his main inspiration. 
Toynbee gave a lecture at Oxford in 1920 titled The Tragedy of Greece, which caught 
quite some attention. This was the first time his thoughts about the Hellenic 
Civilization took largely the form that they were to have later in A Study. Toynbee 
based his ideas on Thucydides’ description of the Peloponnesian War and the 
psychological more than physical damages this war caused on Hellas. Toynbee felt a 
keen parallel between this war and the war that he and the world had just lived 
through. He saw the Peloponnesian War as the very breakdown of the Hellenic 
Civilization and took the tragedy of this particular war and expanded it into the story 
of Hellenism as a whole. The model he thus developed was the one he subsequently 
used to describe the lives of all the world’s civilizations.  
The closest parallel, however, between Toynbee and any other historian, and 
one deserving special attention, is that with Spengler. In 1919 the German 
philosopher and historian Oswald Spengler published the notorious Der Untergang 
                                                
6 McIntire, Reappraisals, p. 115. 
7 Rune Larsen makes a survey of the term’s occurrence in publications in JSTOR, showing the strong 
dissemination of the term’s use since the publication of A Study. 
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des Abendlandes, where he prophesied the inevitable doom of Western Civilization. 
Spengler was the first to do a systematic large-scale survey of all the civilizations 
known to have existed on Earth8 and his verdict was merciless. He saw a pattern of 
growth and decline in civilizations, which he described in terms of the seasons – 
spring, summer, autumn, winter – with the fields of art, religion, politics and science 
expressing themselves in distinctive ways in each season, observable from 
civilization to civilization9. According to Spengler this scheme was an ‘iron law’ of 
history that left no room for exceptions or salvation and he held no doubt that The 
West had entered into its final stage of life, where a culture as he called it entered into 
its civilization-phase characterized by massive cities, overt materialism, artificial 
monetary systems, and breakdown in the style of the culture, the arts and in religion. 
Spengler’s work perhaps more than any other caught the zeitgeist of Post-
World War I Western Europe. The optimism and trust in the steady progress of 
Western Civilization had received a shattering blow and some intellectuals began to 
argue that the previous trust in Enlightenment reason to temper and master the 
destructive aspects of human nature were far from justified10. Yet even if the tone and 
morale in Spengler’s work was very much coloured by the times it still was a 
masterful analysis that fascinates to this day. Toynbee later noted about reading 
Spengler’s work: 
 
”As I read those pages teeming with firefly flashes of historical insight, I wondered at 
first whether my whole inquiry had been disposed of by Spengler before even the 
questions, not to speak of the answers, had fully taken shape in my own mind. One of 
my own cardinal points was that the smallest intelligible field of historical study were 
whole societies and not arbitrarily insulated fragments of them like the nation-states 
of the modern West or the city-states of the Graeco-Roman world. Another of my 
points was that the histories of all societies of the species called civilizations were in 
some sense parallel and contemporary; and both these points were also cardinal in 
Spengler’s system. But when I looked in Spengler’s book for an answer to my 
question about the geneses of civilizations, I saw that there was still work for me to 
do, for on this point Spengler was, it seemed to me, most unilluminatingly dogmatic 
                                                
8 Although he ignored the ones in the Americas. 
9 For a quick overview of Spengler’s thought, Wikipedia has an excellent article on Decline of The 
West. 
10 McIntire, Reappraisals, p. 95-96. 
 14 
and deterministic. (...) Where the German a priori method drew blank, let us see what 
could be done by English empiricism.”11 
 
Although Toynbee still found work for himself to do, he clearly also found much to 
agree with in Spengler’s work. Interestingly though, references to Spengler are 
conspicuous by their absence in A Study and when Toynbee does refer to him it is 
mainly to refute him. He also remarkably excludes him from the list of people and 
places to whom he acknowledges his debt at the end of A Study12. McNeill, I think, 
hits the point in his essay in Reappraisals where he suggests that the ’ambitious 
young historian’ was simply frightened by Spengler’s imposing figure: 
 
“... perhaps his spare references and belittling remarks about Spengler are to be 
understood as a kind of self-protection – a way of standing on his own feet, and 
avoiding the reduction of his own work to the status of a commentary upon or 
dialogue with his predecessor.”13 
 
McNeill notes that Toynbee, according to his own words from 194814, received a 
copy of Spengler’s work from a friend in the summer of 1920. While his seminal 
lecture on Oxford where he gave enduring form to his account of the Hellenic 
Civilization took place in the spring of that year. Supposedly then, Toynbee’s 
structuring of the historical material from this ancient civilization had been completed 
before he encountered Spengler. But McNeill says that he knows of no evidence that 
Toynbee had thought of applying it to the histories of other peoples – as he does full-
scale in A Study – before reading Spengler. I might add, perhaps not even to what he 
was later to treat as the civilization of The West.  
It seems reasonable to assume that Toynbee got this inspiration from 
Spengler. And even if he strongly emphasized throughout his life that breakdown was 
not inevitable for civilizations and that it depended on the choices made by their 
members – one of the key points on which he distinguished himself from Spengler – 
his own analysis showed that every other civilization so far known had already 
perished or broken down, The West being the only one where the diagnosis was at 
                                                
11 Toynbee, Civilization on trial. s. 9-10. 
12 A Study, vol. X, p. 213-42. 
13 McIntire, Reappraisals, p. 35. 
14 Toynbee, Civilization on trial, p. 9. 
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least still uncertain15. In practise then, his verdict over the civilizations of the world 
came significantly close to Spengler’s iron law.  
Clearly, as testified by Toynbee’s own words, his and Spengler’s works share 
many fundamental assumptions. It seems to me that regarding the various phases that 
the civilizations live through they are also largely compatible. Spengler has the notion 
that towards the end of the life of a culture it passes into the stage of civilization. 
Spengler’s term culture corresponds roughly to the active growth phase of Toynbee’s 
civilization, being the young, creative phase of the society in question. While 
Spengler’s civilization seems to be a fitting parallel to Toynbee’s Universal State, 
erected when the creative life has left the society and characterized by materialism, 
massive cities, bureaucracy, cultural decadence, and new religions. Thus, although 
highlighting different aspects of the process, they do seem to share several 
fundamental ideas16. 
The Danish writer Johannes Fabricius published a book in 1967 about 
Toynbee and Spengler, notably treating the two writers together. He makes, I believe, 
an apt parallel between Toynbee’s relation to Spengler and Jung’s relation to Freud17. 
In both cases, pioneer work was done by Spengler and Freud but the full 
consequences of their ground-breaking work was only realized by their predecessor, 
to the extent that the discoveries of the one cannot be fully appreciated without those 
of the other. 
I would add to this that Toynbee seems to be sharper and more precise in his 
analysis of physical historical developments than Spengler was. Spengler, however, 
seems to me to have a more profound and keen understanding of what a culture and 
civilization actually is. With his idea of a culture’s soul and its various cultural 
manifestations, Spengler had a spiritual perspective integrated in his philosophy from 
the start. Consequently, one senses a greater coherence in his work on this level. 
Toynbee, on the other hand, was opened to the importance of religion during the 
latter half of his life and although he can be said to have had illuminating and 
                                                
15 This can certainly also be questioned. In my own experience after travelling for 5 months in the 
Arabic World, the Islamic Civilization is most certainly still alive in the sense that it has a coherent 
cosmology which, as I shall argue in chapter 3, is really what gives unity to a civilization. Being 
younger than The West, the Islamic Civilization is still in its state of intense religious fervour where 
The West was in the Late Middle Ages. 
16 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to make a detailed comparison between Toynbee and Spengler’s 
systems, but a detailed study of the extent of their compatibility would surely be an important and 
illuminating work. 
17 Fabricius, preface. 
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fascinating insights in this field too, it is not, in my opinion, where he displays his 
greatest abilities. This can be seen, perhaps, from the way he changes his mind 
fundamentally several times about the higher religions. This leads us to take a look at 
what influenced him in his religious turn. 
 
Religious turn 
 
The most important change that Toynbee’s thought on history underwent during his 
creation of A Study was the role he assigned to religion. In the beginning he saw 
religions simply serving as mid-wives of civilizations, the civilizations growing out 
of a so-called chrysalis-church and being the true goal and flower of humanity’s 
endeavour. During the 25 years he took to produce A Study he turned this value 
system upside-down as to assign preeminence among man’s creations to the so-called 
higher religions: these most advanced of man’s attempts to live in accordance with 
’Absolute Reality’. This meant that it was now the higher religions that were the goal 
and flower of humanity’s journey through the world and the civilizations mere 
vehicles to bring those religions about. And if they did not, as in the case of a third 
generation civilization born out of a chrysalis-church without itself giving birth to a 
new higher religion (as was the case of The West), he interpreted the entire life of 
that civilization as nothing less than an evolutionary regression or, at best, a useless 
repetition. 
This surely is a drastic turn and probably the one that has done most to anger 
his critics. But where did Toynbee’s religious turn come from? Perhaps from 
primarily three sources. The first was a number of influences from people close to 
him. These included his childhood exposure to the Anglican faith, which was 
propagated to him from his firm but moderate parents, and from his more fanatical 
old ‘Uncle Harry’. Toynbee’s wife Rosalind’s conversion in 1932 to Roman 
Catholicism also had a strong impact on him as did his friendship with the Catholic 
Father Columba with whom he had an extensive correspondence over several years. 
Thus, when Toynbee did open up for a religious view on history towards the end of 
the 1930’s it was for many years an expressly Christian18 historical view. In the first 
                                                
18 In Reappraisals, p. 65, McIntire explores if and when Toynbee’s thought can be classified as 
belonging within the tradition of a Christian philosophy of history. He suggests these ‘straight-forward 
criteria’ for what we might understand by a Christian philosophy of history: “[it] is one whose basic 
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volumes of A Study he gave equal importance to different religious forms of 
humankind, but with his religious turn he for a long time assigned preeminence to 
Christianity. Later he shifted more towards Hinduism and Mahayana Buddhism 
because of the stream of intolerance he saw in Christianity19. 
The second factor was The World Wars. The first war and indeed the second 
broke the optimism of Western intellectuals about the prospects and future of 
Western Civilization. Many concluded that Man was not inherently good nor rational 
as the Enlightenment philosophers had claimed. And Toynbee along with many 
others began to question the ability of reason to deal with these baser aspects of 
human nature. Thus, many, including Toynbee, called for a revival of religion as the 
only means by which to temper the vile nature of man.  
The final and perhaps strongest cause was a number of mystical experiences 
that Toynbee claimed to have had during his life. Two strong life-altering experiences 
occurred in moments of deep personal crisis, plus a number of ’time travelling’ 
experiences catalysed by reading a fragment of a classical text or by visiting an 
ancient site. In these instances, Toynbee felt himself momentarily transported through 
time as to participate in a particular event in the past. He describes these events in 
significant detail in vol. X of A Study under ‘The Quest for a Meaning Behind the 
Facts of History’. In the most noteworthy of them, Toynbee ”...found himself in 
communion, not just with this or that episode in History, but with all that had been, 
and was, and was to come. In that instant he was directly aware of the passage of 
History gently flowing through him in a mighty current, and of his own life welling 
like a wave in the flow of this vast tide.”20 
The two life-altering experiences were not related to history in particular but 
gave Toynbee a clear experience of a greater presence beyond the physical universe 
coming to his aid. One was an experience in 1929 where he felt such a greater 
presence helping him through an intense emotional distress caused by his being 
powerfully attracted to a woman colleague from the University of London. The other 
was ten years later when Toynbee was sitting at the deathbed of Tony, his eldest son, 
who had shot himself on the day of the outbreak of World War II due to an unhappy 
                                                                                                                                      
inspiration and character are given by the ultimate meaning found in Jesus Christ; notions and 
categories not explicitly related to the symbol of Jesus Christ are counted as belonging to a Christian 
philosophy of history if they are, or have been, found within the Christian community of discourse 
about history.” 
19 McIntire, Reappraisals, p. 84-85. 
20 A Study, vol. X, p. 139. 
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love affair. There Toynbee had the experience that perhaps more than anything 
opened him to a spiritual perception of the universe:  
 
”It felt as if the same transcendent spiritual presence, standing for love beyond my, 
or my dying fellow human being’s, capacity had pulled aside, at that awful moment, 
the veil that ordinarily makes us unaware of God’s perpetual closeness to us. God 
had revealed himself for an instant to give an unmistakable assurance of his mercy 
and forgiveness.”21 
 
Whichever way we should interpret the religious and mystical journey of Toynbee22 
and the influence it had on his philosophy of history, it is incredibly interesting. 
However, an investigation of it is not the primary goal of this thesis, so this quick 
touching upon the most important parts of it is mainly meant to serve as background 
knowledge of the main events and forces within this field of Toynbee’s life that 
shaped his great work. What we can say at this point is that these various experiences 
all together caused Toynbee to view the central drama of world history as 
humankind’s perpetual attempt to move closer to God (or ‘Absolute Reality’ as he 
named it) and to live in harmony with it. He cherished the notion that all the higher 
religions were revelations of a part of that ultimate truth and thus all ’equal’ (even if 
assigning preeminence to Christianity at first). In a ’prayer’ in the end of volume X of 
A Study he gives tribute to a great number of prophets and mystics from different 
cultures throughout the ages23. This more than anything made his critics call him the 
prophet of a new ’mish-mash religion’. 
The other important thing to note here concerning religion is that, even though 
Toynbee changed his view fundamentally regarding the purpose of the relationship 
between civilizations and religions, there is a relationship. A large number of his 
critics jumped on exactly his religious turn and consequently his new interpretation 
of that relationship, which has been perhaps the point of controversy that has done 
most to cloud a fruitful discussion of the deeper machinations of his system. 
Whichever way that relationship is interpreted it is clearly there and forms part of the 
                                                
21 McNeill, s. 176. 
22 Thomas W. Africa makes an attempt in McIntire, Reappraisals, p. 105-126. 
23 A Study, vol. X, p. 143-144. 
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evolutionary pattern of a civilization. I will return to this in chapter 3 were I will 
discuss the nature of civilizations. 
 
Reception and critique 
 
Spengler and Toynbee are by far the most famous, but several other writers have 
written within the theoretical framework of Comparative Civilizations. This is not the 
place to give a full summery of that tradition, but two notable figures can be 
mentioned. The first is Carroll Quigley24 and his The Evolution of Civilizations: An 
Introduction to Historical Analysis that mentions both Spengler and Toynbee and is 
generally quite favourable towards the latter. Quigley in his turn inspired Samuel 
Huntington and his work Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order 
which, like A Study, attracted a great amount of popular readership, but was soundly 
dismissed by the academic community25. Generally it must be said that although 
many great thinkers and personalities have been influenced and inspired both by 
Toynbee and Spengler – Henry Kissinger, Joseph Campbell, Ludwig Wittgenstein to 
mention but a few – the Comparative Civilizations approach to history has not had 
many adherents within academic circles, although new works commenting on or 
discussing their systems continue to appear26. 
Critique, on the other hand, has been plentiful. The first collection of critical 
essays appeared in 1956 titled Toynbee and history: Critical Essays and Reviews27. It 
contains 30 essays that are almost all very critical towards various aspects of the 
Toynbeean system. The second collection came in 1989 titled Reappraisals28, 
commemorating Toynbee’s 100th birthday. It contains 13 essays that are quite 
different from the ones in the 1956 collection. One senses that Toynbee has become a 
kind of ’cultural treasure’ a this point, a field of research. And while there are also 
reassessments of parts of his system in Reappraisals, great emphasis is given to the 
act of understanding the man, what made and influenced him, and to the piecing 
                                                
24 Quigley is mostly famous for another of his works, Tragedy and Hope, that details some of the 
secret workings of the ’Anglo-American Establishment’ – the title on his last book. He has been 
repeatedly quoted, at times more than he liked, by people arguing for the existence of a secret elite 
controlling society from behind the scenes.  
25 Larsen, p. 3. Plus note 3 and 5. 
26 Also by non-English writers and historians: For instance Teodoro Tagliaferri’s work Storia 
Ecumenica: materiali per lo studio dell'opera di Toynbee from 2002 in Italian.  
27 Montagu 1956. 
28 McIntire and Perry 1989. 
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together of various more or less relevant details of his life. These two collections of 
essays have been the main focus in my investigation of relevant points of criticism 
levelled against Toynbee’s system.29 
Much of the criticism that appears in Toynbee and History and Reappraisals is, 
however, irrelevant for our present investigation because of the parts of Toynbee’s 
system they deal with. For instance, seemingly relevant and interesting points have 
been levelled against his interpretation of Jewish and Chinese history, but since the 
present thesis focuses on his account of the Hellenic and Western Civilizations, these 
and other interesting treatments we can leave aside. Yet reading through the articles 
in the two collections there are a number of critical points that recur and which are 
relevant for our investigation. I have identified four such general points of criticism, 
which could be described as follows: 
 
1. Toynbee’s tendency towards inconsistent usage of his own terms. This applies 
mainly to his use of the term civilization.30 
2. Toynbee’s combining Rome and Greece in the same civilization.31 
3. Toynbee’s tendency to pass very strong and value-laden judgments on certain 
historical actors and periods. For example the purpose of civilizations vs. the 
so-called higher religions, and Rome’s role in history.32 
4. Toynbee’s notion of growth and how it occurs in civilizations. This is one of 
the parts of his system that has received the severest critique.33 
 
The question is to what extent these points of criticism impinge on the deeper 
structure, the skeleton, of Toynbee’s system. They surely are relevant, but do they rip 
away every bone or is some structure remaining? A work that attempts to reassess the 
validity of Toynbee’s system – even if only regarding the two civilizations of 
                                                
29 Others works on Toynbee include Roland Stromberg’s Arnold J. Toynbee: Historian for an Age in 
Crisis from 1972 that gives a good summery of some of the critique. And then there is the full 
bibliography of Toynbee’s own work plus reviews and articles by others, compiled in 1980 by S. 
Fiona Morton. 
30 See e.g. Montagu, p. 46, where Pieter Geyl notices some of these inconsistencies. Similar points are 
noted by W. den Boer on p. 237. We will look further into this in the beginning of chapter 3. 
31 W. den Boer discusses this several places in his article in Montagu, p. 221-42. J. F. Leddy deals with 
the issue in the article Toynbee and the History of Rome. 
32 On the religious issue, virtually every reviewer who comments on Toynbee’s religious turn and 
interpretation of history. On Rome, W. den Boer in Montagu p 221-42, and J. F. Leddy. 
33 Chiefly Pieter Geyl, several examples in Montagu, p. 39-72. 
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Hellenism and The West – needs to consider these points. This I will do in chapter 3 
under a general treatment of Toynbee’s system. 
 
Approaching Toynbee 
 
Before we look further into Toynbee’s tale of Hellenism and The West we may make 
one more preliminary reflection. This in a way concerns a fifth point of critique 
which could be described as Toynbee’s tendency to simplify historical matters by 
describing only that aspect of them which fits into the grander scheme of his system. 
It could also be called a tendency to over-generalize.  
This is potentially a very large discussion that contains the whole 
epistemological question of what we can know about history in the first place. It is 
not my intention to open it here. The point I want to make is simply this: One may 
think Toynbee makes wrong generalizations or that the patterns he describes do not 
exist. One may think other generalizations or patterns could be made that he does not 
touch upon and which would be more illuminating. But if A Study of History is to 
seem of any use, then one has to be open to the very possibility that generalizations 
per se can be useful in providing knowledge about the world, and that there can exist 
patterns of development in ’social dynamics’ over time. Without an openness towards 
these basic tenets one will find nothing of value in Toynbee’s system, save perhaps a 
good story. 
These do not sound like outrageous assumptions to make, though. I would say 
that we make use of them all the time in order to be able to function in the world. We 
make general assumptions about people and events. We judge from past 
developments what may come to happen in the future, and we base our actions on 
those assumptions. Sometimes they are wrong, sometimes they are right, and in most 
cases they enable us to deal with reality well enough to get us safely through the day. 
Being open to the possibility that these assumptions can be right should not constitute 
a leap of faith then. Yet it is worth stressing because one sometimes encounters 
articles by reviewers who tend to dismiss Toynbee out of a simple a priori conviction 
that ’there are no patterns in historical development’. 
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Chapter 2: Patterns in the Hellenic and Western Civilizations 
 
The Life Cycle of Civilizations 
 
The historical system of Toynbee revolves around civilizations. These come into 
being by overcoming a challenge. In the case of the civilizations that arose out of 
tribal life or primitive Neolithic culture, the challenge was from nature. Of later 
civilizations the challenge came from other humans. Toynbee suggests that since in 
history we are speaking about human beings, we cannot use the methods of natural 
science to explain their behaviour. We cannot look for one cause that always and 
everywhere produces the same result, because what really matters is how humans 
respond to the challenge facing them. And that we cannot predict ”... any more than 
a military expert can predict the outcome of a battle or campaign from an ’inside 
knowledge’ of the dispositions and resources of both the opposing general staffs, or a 
bridge expert the outcome of a game from a similar knowledge of all the cards in 
every hand.”34 
Toynbee thus observes that the same challenge produces entirely different 
reactions among different individuals or groups of people. And this leads him to 
formulate the thesis of Challenge and Response by which he believes that 
civilizations come into being and grow. He also observes that if the challenge is too 
weak or non-existing it does not give rise to growth. If it is too hard the respondents 
are either overwhelmed or they only just manage through a tour de force, which 
exhausts them to such an extent as to render them unable to respond to further 
challenges and grow any further. Challenges within the scope of the golden mean are 
what enable continuous growth. 
Toynbee notes that since different groups of people belonging to the 
civilization will respond differently to the challenge – that is, come up with different 
solutions – the growth process leads to cultural differentiation. When one group or 
individual finds a successful solution to the common challenge, the others copy or 
’adjust’ that solution to their particular situation through the act of mimesis. This is 
the way in which the successes of the creative minorities or individuals become 
common treasures for the whole of the civilization. Another aspect of the growth 
                                                
34 A Study, vol. I, p. 300. 
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process is that when a solution has been found, it tends in time to create an 
imbalance, an elan vital35, which in its turn brings about another challenge. 
Civilizations break down, according to Toynbee, when they don’t manage to 
find a successful solution to the challenge facing them. In that case the challenge does 
not disappear but keeps presenting itself to the unhappy civilization. Termination of 
the growth phase can happen for many reasons and one of the passive ones is that the 
members of the civilization start idolizing their past achievements and thus loose the 
creative momentum. However, by far the most common cause is suicide due to all-
out warfare. This brings us to the crucial term Time of Troubles.  
Toynbee observes that at the beginning of a civilization’s Time of Troubles it 
consists of a number of sovereign states that share the same overall culture, but are 
nevertheless politically independent. These states then begin to wage war on one 
another with an ever-increasing intensity and brutality until it becomes so extreme 
that the civilization breaks down under them. To use Toynbee’s words: ’it inflicts 
mortal wounds upon itself’. The sense of unity pervading the civilization on a cultural 
and spiritual level disappears and can now only be recreated in a political form, a so-
called Universal State, which unifies the entire geographical area of the civilization, 
and often much more. 
The creation of the Universal State is typically performed by the state that 
wins the series of all-out wars that led to the breakdown of the civilization. The 
erection of the Universal State stalls the disintegration process for a while, but it is, 
according to Toynbee, only a temporary respite. The disintegration has set in and 
shows itself in the separation of the body social of the civilization into three distinct 
groups: A dominant minority which creates and upholds the Universal State, an 
internal proletariat that ‘live in but do not feel themselves as part of the society’, the 
members of which create a Universal Church or chrysalis-church, different from the 
ancestral religion of the civilization. And finally an external proletariat which creates 
heroic poetry and hordes of barbarian warriors who clash against the frontiers of the 
Universal State.  
Toynbee moreover sees a rhythm in the disintegration process whereby the 
first breakdown, or rout, is followed by a rally (a re-establishment of order and a 
period of peace), then another rout and a rally in the form of the Universal State, then 
                                                
35 Toynbee takes this term from the French philosopher Henri Bergson. It may be translated as ‘vital 
impetus’. 
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yet another rout followed by a rally as a time of restoration, and finally a rout from 
which the civilization has no more strength to recover. The disintegration process 
thus proceeds in a rhythm of ’three and a half beats’. There is nothing magical about 
this number, Toynbee tells us, but he claims that it fits a number of civilizations.  
He also notes that around the time of the first breakdown or rout, there is an 
awakening of reason and along with that an emerging questioning of inherited beliefs, 
typically the religious ones at the very core of the civilization, and the creation of 
various philosophies occurs. Later, as a sign of cultural disintegration during the 
establishment of the Universal State, there occurs a progressive vulgarization and 
barbarization of the dominant minority, which shows for instance in the language and 
the arts. Another feature of the Universal State is the emergence of a lingua franca 
that allows for easy communication throughout the world state. Finally, the many 
cultures that flow together through the unifying effect of a Universal State also 
produce new and syncretistic forms of religion. 
The barbarians who in the end give the dying civilization its final blow then 
erect successor-states out of its disintegrating body, to a vast degree employing the 
organizational and administrative structures of the now dismembered Universal State. 
They are, however, doomed to failure. After a relatively short period they also 
collapse, followed by an interregnum (or Dark Age or Heroic Age, Toynbee calls it 
by several names) of general chaos and upheaval where the barbarians produce their 
main pieces of so-called heroic poetry. This is the end of the civilization, yet it is not 
the end of all things. The Universal Church of the inner proletariat survives the 
cataclysm and proves to have a far more promising destiny than the short-lived 
successor-states, as it in time gives rise to a new civilization that springs from this 
new spiritual spark. 
Toynbee identified three ’generations’ of civilizations, the first containing the 
ones which supposedly sprang out of primitive tribal or Neolithic culture. Most of 
these originated about 6000 years ago. Civilizations of this generation include 
Minoan Crete, which we will touch upon shortly. The second generation of 
civilizations then sprang out of the first, either created by the dominant minorities in 
the first civilization or by its external proletariat in the form of invading barbarian 
war bands. The Hellenic civilization belongs to this category. Finally, there are the 
civilizations of the third generation, to which our own Western civilization belongs, 
all of which originated according to the scheme outlined above, through a chrysalis-
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church forming within the Universal State of the disintegrating second generation 
civilization.   
These are, as one of Toynbee’s critics Pieter Geyl expressed it, the dry bones 
of the Toynbeean system. In a short while we shall attempt to put some flesh on the 
bones, illustrating the system first with the civilization that Toynbee originally used 
as the basis for formulating his model: The Hellenic. This will be followed by 
Toynbee’s rendering of the history of Western Civilization, to investigate how far the 
comparison goes. The reader may thus judge on his or her own to what extent there 
can be said to be a recurring pattern in the two civilizations. 
 
The end of the Minoan Civilization 
 
The Universal State of the Minoan Civilization and its barbarian successor-states 
 
Toynbee’s tale of the Hellenic civilization begins with the end of another, namely the 
Minoan civilization on ancient Crete. This civilization had during the beginning of 
the 2nd millennium B.C. established a ’thalassocracy’ – a sea-empire – which 
according to Toynbee was the Universal State of the Minoan Civilization that 
maintained peace and order in the Eastern Mediterranean. Our knowledge of the 
Minoan Civilization is rather limited, but we know that they developed a significant 
economy based on redistribution of goods with very precise accounting. We also 
know that they were quite advanced in metallurgy and had extensive trade relations 
with the other peoples in the Mediterranean. The primary deities of worship were 
Goddesses, and this has led some to believe that Minoan Crete was a matriarchal 
society. However, the strong presence of valuable weapons in the graves of Minoan 
men suggest that men as warriors also held a very significant position.36 
The Minoan Civilization collapsed in the 14th century B.C., the palace of 
Knossos being destroyed about 1370 B.C. We don’t know exactly why, but there are 
strong indications that they were taken over a while before, violently or otherwise, by 
the Myceneans, a people with a strong warrior aristocracy who lived at this time in 
Hellas. In 1950 some tablets were found at the Knossos palace written in an 
adaptation of the Minoan script and dated from before the destruction of the palace. 
                                                
36 Martin, p. 26. 
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Research revealed that they were written in Greek, the language of the Myceneans, 
suggesting that representatives of this people had come to dominate the palace society 
on Crete some time before its destruction.37 
According to Toynbee then, the Myceneans are the external proletariat of the 
Minoan Civilization. The art and goods of the Myceneans in the middle of the second 
millennium B.C. are clearly reminiscent of the Minoan style, and it is only after 
having been in contact with the Minoans for a couple of centuries that the Myceneans 
begin to build their own palace complexes on the Greek mainland. Their 
redistributive economic systems also resemble that of Minoan Crete. Since the 
Minoans had colonized various Aegean islands, and possibly also sites on the 
mainland, and since there had been significant trade between the two societies, it is 
reasonable to suppose that the Myceneans had been inspired along the way. The story 
is reminiscent of that of the Roman Empire some two millennia later. Here there were 
also much contact and trade across the Northern frontier, in the end no doubt mostly 
to the barbarians’ benefit, to the extent that much of the Roman army and even some 
of the last emperors were of Germanic origin.38 This corresponds well to Minoan 
Crete supposedly being ruled in the end by the Myceneans.  
After the final destruction of the palace of Knossos the Myceneans ruled for 
about two more centuries. They never united, but existed as several independent 
states. Much about their religion remains obscure, but we know that they worshipped 
deities like Zeus, Hera and Poseidon. In all likelihood, these are the Hellenes that 
Homer depicts in his epics The Iliad and The Odyssey and these poems also tell us of 
a society drenched with warrior virtues like honour, courage, strength and desire for 
glory. The war against Troy, led by King Agamemnon, which is narrated in The Iliad 
is to have taken place around 1200 B.C. These epics, written down some four 
hundred years after the events they allegedly relate, are the heroic poetry of the 
barbarians and they succeed in becoming the common heritage and canonical point of 
reference for all later Hellenes. Indeed, these two epics to a great extent embody the 
spirit that was later manifested in the Hellenic Civilization.  
Shortly after the War against Troy the Mycenean society collapses. In his 
book Ancient Greece Thomas R. Martin attributes the causes to both internal strife 
                                                
37 Martin, p. 28. 
38 In Toynbee’s words: when the frontier of a civilization is no longer pushed ahead but remains firm, 
time works in favour of the barbarians. 
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and war and outer invasions. Toynbee sees it as the result of a major migration wave 
of northern barbarians. The ancient Hellenes of later times remembered an invasion 
of Greek-speaking Dorians. Whatever triggered the movement, in the following two 
centuries the Eastern Mediterranean experiences massive migration and 
displacements of peoples to the extent that the mighty Hittite Civilization in Anatolia 
is destroyed and the Egyptians only just manage to stem the tide against the invading 
’sea-peoples’ as they are called in Egyptian records. Martin doubts that there 
occurred any one larger invasion, however, the influx must have been massive if it 
could destroy a civilization such as the Hittites’. Whichever details are correct, the 
Mycenean society was also destroyed in the process, triggering the Dark Age in 
Hellas: a cultural setback and a time of great movement of peoples, social upheaval 
and instability. Most significantly, the Hellenes seem to revert to illiteracy in this 
period.39 
 
The History of the Hellenic Civilization 
 
Birth and growth 
 
Toynbee then posits that the Hellenic civilization is born out of the challenge of 
political instability and turmoil in this period. And that this challenge, after a couple 
of centuries, was solved through the invention of the political institution of the city-
state. These were formed gradually during the Hellenic Dark Age, whereby 
inhabitants slowly revived urban centers and conquered the more out-lying areas, 
especially the often savage semi-barbarian tribes inhabiting the highlands around the 
cities. Over a couple of centuries, this resulted in a new political stability and in 
Hellas being politically organized into numerous little independent city-states. Some 
of the Panhellenic cultural and religious centers, like Delphi, are also founded in this 
period and we begin to have the first games being held, like the Olympian and 
Phrygian games. 
This new stability and increasing prosperity, however, led to the next 
challenge. An end to the migration period, lack of fighting and less destruction of the 
land because of marauding armies; all this led to growth in the food supply and 
                                                
39 Martin, p. 30-36. 
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population increase. Yet Hellas is a mountainous land and the maximum amount of 
food that can be grown there is limited. So sometime around the 8th century B.C. the 
population began to outgrow the means of subsistence. 
Toynbee sees this as the next challenge confronting the Hellenic Civilization 
as a whole during the 8th-6th centuries B.C and to which the various city-states 
reacted in quite different ways. Most of them reacted in the perhaps rather uninspired 
way of simply exporting the population surplus through the creation of colonies 
around the coasts of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Thus, the challenge did not 
create any significant transformation within the body social of the exporting city-
state; instead, the pressure was simply diffused.  
Differently so in the case of Athens and Sparta. Perhaps because Sparta did 
not have any immediate access to the sea, they decided to instead attack and conquer 
their nearest Hellenic neighbours, the Messenians. After a prolonged war the 
Messenians were subdued and turned into slaves, now farming their former land for 
their Spartan masters. The Spartans satisfied their hunger for land, but in order to 
keep the servile Messenians down they had to transform themselves into a full-time 
professional warrior aristocracy who were forbidden any other profession than war. 
The system worked and certainly the highly militarized Spartans played a decisive 
role in fighting off the Persians about a century later. However, it was, according to 
Toynbee, also an evolutionary dead-end. The Spartans stiffened in their militarism, 
held captive by the constant threat of Messenian uprisings and were thus unable to 
develop further.  
The Athenians chose another path. They also eschewed the path of 
colonization, but instead of putting conquest in its place they specialized their 
agricultural production towards production of olive oil and wine with the purpose of 
export. This allowed them to import sufficient amounts of grain, the mainstay of the 
ancient Mediterranean diet, for their livelihood. In time Athens became the great 
trading and seafaring city-state that Pericles later claimed to be ‘The school of Hellas’ 
where all the cultural, political, intellectual and artistic achievements took place that 
have been such an inexhaustible inspiration for later times. The challenge of over-
population is perhaps Toynbee’s most illustrious example of how the growth process 
leads to still greater differentiation within the civilization, because its members react 
differently to the challenges with which they are faced.  
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In volume III of A Study of History where Toynbee describes the growth 
process of the Hellenic Civilization he recounts three ’chapters’ in that process. The 
first two are the ones just presented. Since the Hellenes had now succeeded in 
establishing an economically interdependent society, each city-state found that it had  
important interests at stake beyond the geographical boundaries of its territory. This 
interconnectedness on the economic plane necessitated the development of an equal 
degree of unity on the political plane, or of some kind of Pan-Hellenic political forum 
where the Hellenes could solve political problems. And this was the third challenge 
that they did not manage to find a solution to in due time and which, according to 
Toynbee, caused the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization. 
However, in his book Hellenism which Toynbee wrote much later than the 
first volumes of A Study he operates with two extra challenges falling between the 
second and third ’growth chapter’. The first of these is the combined challenge from 
Etruscans and Phoenicians who halted the Hellenic expansion in the Mediterranean 
during the 6th century B.C. The second is the invasion by the Persians in the 
beginning of the 5th century B.C. Since he includes these two challenges in his later 
account of the Hellenic Civilization we must assume that they should also be counted 
as part of the growth period. 
The challenge from the Etruscans and Phoenicians meant that the still 
growing population could no longer be exported through the creation of colonies. 
Since there was an aristocracy who at this point owned a great deal of the limited 
amount of land, this created significant social tension in a time of such scarcity. Two 
other developments contributed further to this process, according to Toynbee. One 
was the invention of cheaper iron weapons and phalanx warfare that gave a 
disciplined close-formation unit of yeoman hoplites superiority over a traditional 
bronze-clad ’Homeric’ chariot-borne champion. This new military ascendancy of the 
yeoman farmer made him feel that he too should have a share in the political power. 
The other factor was the invention of coinage that spread throughout Hellas from 
about 625 B.C. Coinage made the establishment of an organized loan market 
possible, which was in turn heavily exploited by the aristocracy who still had a 
surplus to lend. If the borrower was unable to pay his debts he would, if he was a 
peasant, lose his land and if he was a landless labourer, the creditor would have the 
right to sell him and his family as slaves overseas. This in time led to severe social 
tension and ultimately revolutions in most of the Hellenic city-states in which the 
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aristocracy was disposed from power and supplanted either by a coalition of yeomen 
farmers and businessmen, the so-called oligarchies as in the Istmian states, or by a 
new system which radically enfranchised all free-born male citizens, such as in the 
Athenian democracy. Thus, the outer challenge from the Hellenes’ competitors found 
its response in a social and political transformation of the city-state. And according to 
Toynbee in Hellenism this challenge also spurred the economic specialization that 
had begun as the result of the Malthusian challenge of over-population. 
We sense already that the process of growth is perhaps more complex than 
that outlined by Toynbee in the first volumes of A Study of History. We shall return to 
this point in chapter 3 under ‘The Notion of Growth’. 
The second of these two ’new’ challenges came with the Persian invasion. 
And this, Toynbee says, ironically gave the Hellenes a golden opportunity to come up 
with a solution along the lines of a Pan-Hellenic political framework. In order to 
stand a chance against the invading Persians, the Hellenic city-states were forced to 
band together, though this was very much against their traditional practice of regular 
interstate warfare. Athens, Sparta and a couple of other Hellenic states managed to 
put their mutual grievances aside and form the alliance that against all odds defeated 
the Persians. This is one of the most celebrated victories in the western tradition and 
there is no need to recount it in detail here. Yet in the fifty years following this 
miraculous feat the Hellenic spirit soared to the heights from where it produced the 
age we now know as Classical Greece.  
 
Time of troubles and breakdown of Hellenism 
 
Unfortunately for the Hellenes the alliance against the Persians did not translate into a 
permanent political framework uniting all of Hellas. With Athens creating the Delian 
League to police the sea and Sparta heading the Lacedaimonian League with the 
landed army, the scene was set for the Peloponnesian War 50 years later. This war 
was so devastating that the Hellenic society was never the same and it was, according 
to Toynbee, the first breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization. Sparta eventually won 
the war and inherited the Athenian empire, but exercised their rule even more harshly 
than the Athenians had done. The 66 years following the war saw the attempts of 
various federations of city-states to create political concord and stability, as well as 
attempts of other individual city-states – Thebes for a quick moment – to be the 
 31 
leading city-state in Greece. They all failed. Peace and concord is temporarily 
restored when Macedonia under Philip II imposes her supremacy on the Hellenic 
city-states and creates the League of Corinth in 337 B.C., an alliance of all European 
Hellenic city-states with the exception of Sparta. However, this factor that could have 
stabilized the political situation is nullified. Alexander squanders Macedonia’s 
strength in his ten-year campaign against and beyond the Persian Empire, and after 
his premature death his generals continue fighting each other for 50 years in 
parcelling out his empire, the wars now fuelled by the immense plunder from the 
Persian Empire. 
Toynbee sees some balance of power emerging around 275 B.C. between the 
four successor-states of Alexander’s empire and some measure of stability being 
restored during the 3rd century B.C. This is his first rally phase. But it doesn’t last 
long. In the other end of the Mediterranean, Rome and Carthage collide in the 2nd 
Punic War in 218 B.C. which eventually engulfs the rest of the Mediterranean world 
and all the other powers in struggles with Rome from which she emerges supreme. In 
an act of ultimate vindication Rome annihilates Carthage and Corinth in 146 B.C., 
which leaves no power left to challenge her in the Mediterranean. But it is not 
enough. During the next 115 years Rome is constantly engaged in warfare until the 
Empire – and the Hellenic culture – is spread out over most of Europe, North Africa 
and the Middle East. After several bouts of internal strife, civil wars and violent 
revolutions the Roman Empire, and Hellenism as a whole, finally finds peace and 
restoration from the saving hands of Augustus in 31 B.C. Toynbee calls the period 
218-31 B.C. The Age of Agony, his second rout. It is followed by Augustus’ rally and 
creation of the Universal State and Pax Romana. In other words, it is the Romans 
who finally provide the Hellenic Civilization with the Pan-Hellenic political solution 
that it had needed desperately for 400 years. But the solution comes too late. The 
creative spark of the civilization had succumbed due to the continuous wars and 
according to Toynbee, the unification of Hellenism under Roman arms could only 
postpone, not avert the disintegration. 
 
Universal State-phase and barbarian successor-states 
 
The Universal State of the civilization preceding our Western Civilization is The 
Roman Empire. This state maintains a more stable and durable form after Augustus’ 
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victory at Actium in 31 B.C. The Roman Empire is Toynbee’s archetypal example of 
a civilization’s Universal State and the Romans exhibit tremendous energy in uniting 
their Empire on the outer practical level. Toynbee mentions a number of examples of 
this, including the creation of a well-kept system of roads extending throughout the 
empire, the codification of Roman Law, a universal system of weights and measures, 
a consistent and, in time, fair administration of the empire’s provinces, and of course 
the vital system of garrisons, fortifications and standing armies that protected the 
Empire against the barbarians. The lingua franca of the Empire are Latin and Greek, 
the latter of which had already been spoken for several centuries in the areas 
conquered by Alexander. Of the philosophies that originate from the beginning of the 
Time of Troubles, Toynbee mentions Platonism, Stoicism, Epicureanism and 
Pyrrhonism. 
At the same time as the Universal State is coming into being, another very 
peculiar process is taking place. Through Rome’s conquests in the East the 
indigenous religious movements of these areas, the so-called mystery cults, begin 
flooding into the Roman Empire. There is Isis worship from Egypt, Mithraism from 
Persia, Judaism and, in time, Christianity from Israel to mention but a few. Of these, 
Christianity wins out and becomes the spiritual spark that gives birth to the new 
Western Civilization. The early Christian Church functions as Toynbee’s chrysalis-
church, carrying and maturing this religious spark until it can unfold itself fully in a 
new civilization. 
Meanwhile, the creative, spiritual life of the old civilization is gradually 
ebbing away. To a still greater extend, its inner life is gone and it is being held 
together only by the outer structure of its Universal State. Toynbee sees a long rally 
in the two centuries after Augustus whereas the civilization then collapses again in 
the 3rd century A.D., the Empire falling virtually apart in the period of the Soldier 
Emperors between 235-284 A.D. This is the third rout, during which time there were 
several independent states or miniature-empires in the area of the Roman Empire. Yet 
the Illyrian armies manage to put the Empire back together in a third rally and the 
Empire, and the Hellenic Civilization, experience the last longer period of peace and 
restoration in the 4th and parts of the 5th century. Finally, the barbarians break 
through a number of times during the 5th century and rout Hellenism for the last 
time. 
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The invading barbarians then erect their various successor-states, the 
Visigoths in Spain and parts of France, the Vandals in North Africa and other tribes 
elsewhere. They are generally short-lived, the strongest last a couple of centuries, and 
to a great extent build on the social and administrative structures of the now 
dismembered Roman Empire. The most successful of them is no doubt Charlemagne, 
king of the Franks and successor to the Merovingian dynasty, who for a while 
manages to reunite a large part of Europe in what Toynbee calls ’a ghost of the 
Roman Empire’. In the civilizational cycle these successor-states correspond to the 
Mycenean lords who took over the Minoan Civilization – with a Frankish 
Charlemagne being an apt equivalent of a Mycenean Agamemnon: both legendary 
warrior kings of the successor-states40. There are also other interesting parallels 
between the two. They both wage a long and seemingly unnecessary war – 
Agamemnon against Troy and Charlemagne against the Saxons – which, despite its 
being ultimately successful, does not prevent their victor’s ruin. According to legend, 
Agamemnon dies at the hands of his wife on his return. Shortly afterward follows the 
great migration period of the 12th century B.C. which destroyed both the Mycenean 
realms and the great Hittite Civilization. And according to Toynbee, it was exactly 
Charlemagne’s war against the Saxons that unleashed the fury of the Scandinavian 
Vikings, which together with the Magyars from the Eurasian steppe and the Saracens 
from North Africa, harried Europe in the subsequent centuries. 
The most significant difference between the Myceneans and the Frankish and 
other successors to the Roman Empire is that the Myceneans kept their own religion 
and that their heroic poetry, The Iliad and The Odyssey, became the common heritage 
of the Hellenes and the mythological foundation of their civilization. On the contrary, 
the various Germanic and Gothic tribes parcelling out the Roman Empire did not 
keep their own pagan religion; instead they became willing converts to Christianity. 
As noted previously, Toynbee thus observes that the Hellenic Civilization, along with 
most other 2nd generation civilizations, were founded by the external proletariat of 
the preceding civilization, in the form of the invading barbarian war bands. Whereas 
the Western Christian Civilization, along with the other 3rd generation civilizations, 
grew out of the chrysalis-church founded by the internal proletariat of the preceding 
                                                
40 To my knowledge, Toynbee does not mention this parallel anywhere, yet I find it conspicuous. 
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civilization; that is, by the Christians and their church which developed within the 
framework of the Roman Empire.  
Another interesting difference is that in the Hellenic case, the heroic poetry is 
created by the first ’line’ of barbarians: the Myceneans who crush the Minoan 
Civilization. The second line following in their wake with the great migration period, 
as far as we know, did not create anything except havoc. In the case of The West it is 
opposite. The first line of the barbarians that become almost immediately Christian 
and create their successor-states to the Roman Empire did not create anything 
resembling Homer’s epics. While the second line, with the Vikings, was very 
productive. Their creations include such works as the poem Beowulf, The Icelandic 
Sagas and The Edda. These are the heroic poetry of what Toynbee calls the abortive 
Scandinavian Civilization, which according to him seriously threatened the young 
Western Christian Civilization at one point during the medieval Dark Age. Another 
historical scenario could have been, he says, that the Vikings had succeeded with 
their sieges of London, Paris and Constantinople and that it had been the Gods of 
Asgaard that had delivered the impulse to the new civilization – as the Olympians did 
to the Hellenic – instead of the Christian. It went otherwise and the Christian West 
managed to ward off the series of barbarian challenges, both through hard-pressed 
military defence and, more significantly, through conversion of the invaders, first on 
the lands they conquered and secondly through missionaries in the barbarians’ 
homelands.  
 
The History of the Western Civilization 
 
Birth and growth 
 
Toynbee does not give a full coherent account of the history of The West as he does, 
for instance, of Hellenism. Its history lies scattered across the pages of A Study of 
History to be assembled by the persistent reader. The response to the Viking raids, 
which constitutes the first chapter in the growth process of The West, is thus to be 
found in volume II under The Stimulus of Pressures41 while ’chapter 2 and 3’ in this 
growth process is described in volume III, under the general analysis of the growth of 
                                                
41 A Study, Vol. II, p. 194-201, with the sub-heading In the Western World over against Scandinavia. 
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civilizations42. Chapter 4, which is the challenge of anarchy that the world was facing 
in his time, he deals with extensively in several of his later writings. 
According to Toynbee, the Western Civilization is born out of the struggle 
against the Viking invasions in the end of the medieval Dark Age. These continuous 
raids prompted the development of the Feudal System, because a far more efficient 
fighting-machine was needed to deal with the Scandinavian attacks than the 
traditional poorly equipped militia consisting of small free householders. Military 
equipment such as the horse, coat of mail, and well-forged swords and helmets were 
expensive and needed more people to chip in to equip a single warrior. Thus there 
gradually emerged a professional mounted fighting force – knights – each supported 
by a number of smallholders. As Toynbee’s authority on the subject says: “One might 
say – using political expressions with some caution – that the more ancient 
democratic arrangement had to be replaced by an aristocratic one.”43 
Toynbee also notes that not only the Feudal System, but also the kingdoms of 
England and France came into being as a response to the Vikings raids. And that the 
capitals of these two new kingdoms became London and Paris which bore the main 
burden of the attacks and which also at crucial moments prevented the Vikings from 
advancing further up the Thames and Seine. This somehow made them more 
preferable as capitals than other cities that were both more easy to defend and also 
more prosperous at the time. The reaction of Western Christendom also shows in the 
creation of the English and French national epics The Battle of Maldon and Chanson 
de Roland, which may be seen as examples of heroic poetry on the side of the 
’defenders’. Since both France and England were heavily settled and influenced by 
Vikings it is perhaps not unreasonable to assume that they influenced the Christian 
culture with their poetic vein. Indeed in France there developed a flourishing heroic 
poetry with the numerous chanson de geste which became the beginning of the 
French literary tradition. 
After the Vikings had been resisted militarily or allowed to retain their 
conquests against converting to Christianity, Western Christianity then took to the 
offensive by sending peaceful conquerors to the homelands of the Vikings in the form 
of monks and missionaries. This second reaction to the challenge is so successful that 
                                                
42 A Study, Vol. III, p. 341-363. 
43 Vinogradoff, Paul: English society in the eleventh century (Oxford 1908, Clarendon Press), p. 30 
and 34. See A Study of History, vol. III., p. 200. 
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during the 11th century virtually all of Europe is brought within the fold of the 
Roman Catholic Church44. And indeed, the converted Vikings become a powerful 
military asset for Western Christianity. The descendants of Rollo’s Vikings who 
settled in Normandy in the beginning of the 10th century are found conquering areas 
from both the Muslims and from Orthodox Christendom in the Mediterranean a little 
over a century later. Indeed, some have described the first crusade that went out 
primarily from Normandy in the late eleventh century as essentially a Viking 
campaign under Christian banners45. 
The next chapter in the growth of The West comes with the Renaissance in 
Italy. And Toynbee compares this with the growth phase in the Hellenic Civilization 
where Athens made her prime contributions: “Like Attica in Hellas, Lombardy and 
Toscany in Western Christendom served, after withdrawal, as a segregated social 
laboratory in which the experiment of transforming a locally self-sufficient 
agricultural society into an internationally interdependent commercial and industrial 
society was successfully carried out.”46 
It is not really clear in Toynbee’s analysis what the challenge was that 
brought the Italian city-states to perform this creative act. In any case, they do it, and 
Toynbee determines their achievements to be three in kind: “The substitution of a 
democratic for an aristocratic form of government; the substitution of a commercial 
and industrial for a purely agricultural economy; and the introduction of a new 
standard of business-like efficiency into the conduct of both economics and 
politics.”47 
The Italians were not alone in Europe in experimenting with the new city-state 
way of life, although they have had the greatest legacy. In Flanders there was a large 
cluster of independent city-states too, several in South and West Germany and 
Switzerland, plus the strong Hansa towns in Northern Germany. Yet this form of 
political organization was not ’native’ to Western Christendom, says Toynbee. The 
city-states had emerged in Hellas out of the chaos of the Dark Age, while in The 
West the response to that challenge had been the formation of the medieval feudal 
kingdoms and principalities. Thus, even though by the end of the 14th century the 
                                                
44 This is apart from certain areas to the east like Poland and Lithuania that were converted during the 
13th and 14th centuries. 
45 Somerwell, vol. I, p. 158. 
46 A Study, vol. III., p. 342. 
47 A Study, vol. III., p. 354. 
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’feudal darkness’ of Europe was thickly sown by the starry light from the new 
flourishing city-states, this new city-state cosmos proved ultimately abortive. The 
Italians got rid of it themselves in the process of welding 70-80 minor city-states into 
10 larger ones, because they all – except Venice – lost their new-won democratic 
freedom in the process. Despite this sacrifice the Italian city-states were still not able 
to hold their own against the feudal kingdoms of Transalpine Europe. The other city-
states of Europe banded together in various federations, which were all in time 
defeated by the neighbouring feudal kingdoms, with the notable exception of the 
Swiss. 
With these developments it was decided that The West was not going to be a 
society of city-states. There originated instead the challenge of applying the political 
and economic inventions of the city-states of Renaissance Italy to the much larger 
feudal kingdoms of the rest of Europe. Toynbee sees this as the third grand challenge 
in the history of the growth of Western Civilization48. Both the Dutch and the Swiss 
take up this challenge but because they ultimately are city-state federations 
themselves and not the feudal kingdoms which the challenge lies in transforming, and 
because they are not isolated enough to carry out their creative work, they fail. It 
becomes England that solves the problem by adapting the medieval institution of 
’parliament’ to a new use. Originally, this was an institution whereby representatives 
of the Estates of the Realm would meet periodically with the Crown in order to vent 
their grievances and consult with or criticize the government. The achievement of the 
English was, when the time came, to transform this medieval institution into a body 
that could actually run the government instead of merely consulting with it. It was, in 
other words, the invention of representative democracy. This new political liberty for 
the common man and increased influence and control over one’s life was also 
essential, Toynbee says, for the subsequent industrial revolution that was triggered 
precisely in England. In the old city-states, these two inventions had also gone hand 
in hand, although on a much smaller scale. 
As for the last challenge that Toynbee believes faces Western Civilization, it 
is the same that broke the neck of the Hellenic Civilization: namely of creating some 
form of political unity in a world that has become irretrievably interconnected and 
                                                
48 Again, it does not appear crystal clear why this was a challenge. We will discuss this further in 
chapter 3 under growth.  
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interdependent on the economic level. A world of still more potent and dangerously 
contending powers. This brings us to the Time of Troubles. 
 
Time of Troubles and possible breakdown of The West 
 
Toynbee is quite wary about expressing his opinions about our own civilization and 
whether it has broken down or not. He regularly expresses the difficulty of this 
assessment in allegories such as it being impossible for the crew of a ship, while 
undertaking their voyage, to know whether the ship will be destroyed on rocks, 
caught and sunk by storms or whether it will find a safe harbour somewhere at an 
unknown destination49. He does, however, believe to detect a rhythm following the 
breakdown-rhythm of the Hellenic Civilization. 
He sees two clearly distinguished paroxysms of all-out warfare, namely what 
he calls ’The Wars of Religion’ and ’The Wars of Nationality’. The first begins with 
the violence unleashed by the Reformation that raged across Europe during the 
sixteenth century and escalated into the Thirty Years War from 1618-48. After these 
Toynbee sees a temporary rally emerging in the end of the seventeenth century and 
stretching into the eighteenth, brought about by the ’Principle of Religious 
Toleration’ which served to moderate the religious tempers. In this period, though 
short, wars did occur but were mostly a kind of ’sport of the kings’, shorter and more 
moderate. However, with the Napoleonic Wars following the French Revolution the 
Wars of Nationality began: the second series of all-out wars in The West, culminating 
with World War I and II in Toynbee’s own lifetime. The wars of this second rout or 
breakdown were even bloodier and more ferocious than the first, both because of the 
increased destructiveness of the weapons and the number of soldiers enrolled in the 
armies, but also because ’the object – or pretext – of the hostilities was less sublime 
and etherial’.50 As Toynbee says, the human soul abhors a spiritual vacuum, so when 
it ousted religion it decided to worship nationality in its place51, only with a worse 
result. The Napoleonic Wars were also the first attempt at creating the Universal State 
of The West through force of arms that came relatively close to success during the 
                                                
49 A Study, vol. VI, p. 313. 
50 A Study, vol. VI. P. 317. 
51 A similar point is made by Carl Gustav Jung. 
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first half of Napoleon’s reign. The second attempt was Hitler’s, likewise almost 
successful for a short period, but also doomed to failure. 
During the second rout of the Western Time of Troubles we see the 
emergence of the mass cities that Spengler talks about: London, Paris, New York, and 
which the Hellenic Civilization saw emerging during the Hellenistic Period in cities 
like Rome, Carthage and Alexandria. We also see the emergence of two new lingua 
franca: French and later English. Latin was of course lingua franca all through the 
Middle Ages in Europe but it was a remnant, perhaps the most enduring one, from the 
Roman Empire. English and French are the new lingua franca of The West that 
emerge during the modern period. During the Time of Troubles there also emerge, 
according to Toynbee, the Western philosophies of ‘Cartesianism’ and 
‘Hegelianism’, corresponding to the Greek philosophies of the Hellenistic Period.  
Toynbee’s personal experience of having lived through two World Wars and 
the general climate of the Cold War in which he lived during his older days, made 
him an unwavering proponent for the establishment of some kind of global political 
world order or actual world government. He claimed that The West over the 
preceding centuries had ‘cast its political and economic net’ out over the rest of the 
world to such an extent that all other civilizations on Earth had become incorporated 
in the internal proletariat of The West. The world government that he so longed for 
was thus what would become the Universal State of The West – global in scope for 
the first time in history. His historical analysis had convinced him that militarism had 
been the doom of nearly every other civilization having existed on Earth and in an 
age of atomic weapons and two contending superpowers, The West and indeed the 
whole world were suspended in the constant threat of sudden, final annihilation. The 
only way Toynbee foresaw that this catastrophe could be averted was through the 
creation of some kind of world government that could perform the same service for a 
Westernized world that the Roman Empire performed for the Hellenic Civilization. 
Yet towards the end of his life he wasn’t optimistic about its prospects. 
 
A Western Universal State and new religions? 
 
Toynbee died in 1975 and did not see any signs of a Western Universal State 
emerging in his later years. Can we, if we accept the basic premise of his system that 
a civilization towards the later part of its life becomes unified in a Universal State, 
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see any signs of it now, 37 years after his death? If we do accept that premise, I find it 
reasonable to assume – as I will argue further in chapter 3 under ‘Time of Troubles vs. 
the Expansion-breakdown-model’ – that we are now at a point of development in The 
West that corresponds roughly to where the Greeks and Romans were in the 
beginning of the 1st century B.C. At this time, Rome was clearly dominant in the 
Mediterranean, but was still being severely challenged on several occasions – for 
instance by King Mithridates VI of Pontus during several wars from 88-63 and by the 
Parthians in 53. Thus, the Empire did not come out in its Universal State form before 
the end of the 1st century B.C. Accordingly, if we look for possible signs of an 
emerging Western Universal State we should keep in mind that it may only just be... 
emerging. 
One obvious sign seems to be the emergence of the EU, the first serious 
political unification of the heartland of the West since the Roman Empire. This is 
unquestionably a significant achievement. The Europe that conquered and colonized 
the world through centuries and then ravaged it in two devastating World Wars is 
now working peacefully towards still greater integration and co-operation. Such a 
reunification on the political level after we have lost it on the spiritual (or, as I will 
argue later, cosmological) level is a clear feature of an emerging Universal State. 
However, The West today is much more than Europe, so we should not let ourselves 
be deceived into considering modern Europe to be the equivalent of the Roman 
Empire. That role befalls the United States. The European Union is rather the parallel 
of some Greek confederacy.  
There are several intriguing parallels between ancient Rome and present-day 
United States. They are both made up by immigrants from the motherland of the 
civilization (the Romans maybe not so much in reality, but according to their own 
legend which tells us where their cultural allegiance lay). They also seem to share 
enough characteristics in their national cultures to make a comparative study of their 
national mentalities highly interesting. But since this is not the proper place for a 
deeper cultural analysis, let us limit ourselves to a few hard facts from three different 
fields. First of all, with more than 700 military bases on every continent of the 
world52, the US navy permanently stationed in every major ocean and US expenditure 
                                                
52 Sources vary on this one, but most put it above 700. Republican candidate for President Ron Paul in 
a presidential debate on Sept. 12, 2011, put it as high as over 900 overseas bases. 
 41 
on ’defence’ accounting for 41 percent of the total world military budget the US is 
the undisputed military hegemon on the planet today. Of course, in an age of nuclear 
weapons no one power can ever gain complete supremacy but by every other military 
measure, the US has it. It is also the only country that continues to wage expensive 
full-scale wars in foreign far-away countries. Economically it still is the largest 
economy in the world and with the dollar being the world’s reserve currency (the 
reason that made it possible for them to accumulate such staggering amounts of debt) 
it also has an absolute advantage on this level. Indeed, this privileged status of the 
dollar is what made it possible for the US to pay for its military supremacy53. Finally, 
on the political level, we may note the leading role that the US played in the creation 
of the host of UN and international financial institutions that were founded after 
World War II and which by now could be said to perform some form of emerging 
global governance. In short, noting just a few of the most conspicuous features, the 
US might be interpreted as at least attempting to perform a similar role to that of the 
Roman Republic in the 1st century B.C. Whether they will succeed is of course an 
open question. 
The final development that has occurred since Toynbee’s death and which 
clearly has a parallel in the 1st century B.C. Hellenic Civilization is the emergence in 
The West of new and old religions. Toynbee took a world tour in 1956-57, and one of 
the declared goals was to look for possible signs of new syncretistic religions54. He 
didn’t find many and attributed this to the ‘continuous vitality of the Christian 
Church’. Apparently, he did not notice what was going on around him about a decade 
later with the Youth Revolt of the late 1960’s and the exploding interest in Eastern 
religions in much of the counterculture of that period. Since then, interest in religions, 
ideas and spiritual practices from other cultures has increased to the point that today 
one will find classes in yoga, meditation, Buddhism, tantra and a host of other New 
Age philosophies and self-help practices on virtually every street corner in every 
medium sized Western city. Not to mention, of course, the growing size of Islamic 
communities within Western societies of today. Clearly, the cultural and religious 
melting pot that is another conspicuous feature of a civilization’s Universal State has 
become a reality in The West today, and one that continues to grow. 
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2011/sep/14/ron-paul/ron-paul-says-us-has-
military-personnel-130-nation/  
53 Layne, Christopher. Article. 
54 McNeill, p. 235. 
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Summary 
 
If we should sum up the essence of Toynbee’s system it might be as follows: Both the 
Hellenic and the Western Civilizations originate out of a Dark Age of general chaos. 
For several centuries they each share a common culture and religion but are split up 
in a multitude of independent political units. Circa half way between the civilization’s 
birth and the coming into being of its Universal State, various ’secular’ philosophies 
begin to occur, questioning inherited religious beliefs, and the Times of Troubles 
begin. It comes in two main routs and after the second, the only remaining 
superpower creates the Universal State (which remains to be seen full-scale in The 
West). The couple of centuries leading up to the creation of the Universal State see 
the creation of massive cities and the emergence of two new lingua franca that allows 
for easy communication throughout the Universal State. Around the time of the 
creation of the Universal State new and old religious movements gain footing and 
become increasingly popular within the civilization. 
We ought perhaps to include also the obvious parallel between the barbarian 
successor-states of Agamemnon and Charlemagne, but strictly speaking, they belong 
to the interregnum before Toynbee’s civilizations come into being. This definition of 
civilization, however, we will deal with in the following. 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Discussion of Toynbee’s system and the critique 
 
In the foregoing chapter I have presented the essentials of Toynbee’s account of 
Hellenism and The West. In the present chapter we will be giving this account and 
the system that he presents for the development of these two civilizations a serious 
treatment. There are two basic questions that will be guiding us in this inquiry. One is 
an attempt to assess the validity of his system, the patterns and processes he 
describes. Are they real? Do they occur the way he describes them? If they are wrong 
or imprecise can we then clarify, amend or update them in any way?  
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The second question and interest is: If there are any such patterns, then why 
do they occur in this particular way? This, in other words, is an attempt to understand 
the deeper mechanisms of Toynbee’s system. Not merely acknowledging that this 
cogwheel turns in that direction and that pipe runs over there, but understanding why 
they do so. In a sense, this is perhaps the question that makes this a philosophy thesis. 
We might just lean back and enjoy the historical ride that Toynbee takes us on, or 
discuss whether this or that process actually occurs or not – all good and important 
undertakings – but the philosophical impulse ventures one step further and asks why 
it is so. In so far as there are some recurring patterns that we can establish with 
reasonable certainty, then why do they occur?  
For instance, why does a civilization get a Universal State at a late stage of its 
life? And why do people at this point begin to feel attracted to new religions? These 
are some of the parts of a civilization’s pattern that seem most clearly observable. 
There are of course many possible answers to these questions and they can be 
illuminated from many angles. Most branches of the human and social sciences will 
have some theory to explain the rise of new religious movements today. I think an 
interesting perspective on this theme may be reached if we probe the question of what 
a civilization actually is. An explanation of what a civilization really is ought to be 
able to present at least some understanding of the processes occurring within a 
civilization.  
This, then, is the question we will be pursuing in the following. It is the 
question we will begin with because the explanation that I will venture may help us 
when we next turn to the discussion of the growth process and whether there can be 
discerned a recurring pattern here. Finally, we will look into the term Time of 
Troubles and consider if this dynamic fits together with the civilization’s physical 
expansion. 
 
A Cosmology as the Core of a Civilization 
 
The Dutch historian Pieter Geyl is one of the writers who notes Toynbee’s 
inconsistent usage of the term civilization. For instance during a discussion of 
Toynbee’s analysis of the origin of civilizations and his use of Holland as the 
example of this, he remarks that: “The civilization of Holland, however, is no more 
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than a parochial part of the great Western civilization55”. According to Toynbee’s 
own definition that is. W. den Boer notes a similar case regarding Sparta’s relation to 
the Hellenic Civilization, where Toynbee has classified Sparta as one among five 
arrested civilizations that have ceased to grow. Boer does not suppose that Toynbee 
had simply made a mistake, but instead assumes that he deliberately “segregated and 
removed [Sparta] from Greek civilization as an alien body”56. In Reconsiderations 
from 1961, however, Toynbee skipped the notion of arrested civilizations, and it 
clearly seems like a simple misapplication of terms. 
More troubling could seem his frequent updating of the list of civilizations, 
how many there were and which historical societies they were comprised of, although 
it surely demonstrated his willingness to reconsider his previous conclusions. Yet this 
is also of less importance to us, since the civilizations of Hellenism and The West and 
the grander phases that they had gone through in their lives, remained unchanged in 
Toynbee’s system throughout his life.  
The main difficulties and inconsistencies regarding civilization really arise 
when Toynbee attempts to define it. Let us see if we can clarify what he means. In the 
one-volume edition of A Study of History from 1972 Toynbee writes the following 
about the nature of civilizations: 
 
“A. N. Whitehead sure hits the truth in a passage ... in which he declares that ’in 
each age of the world distinguished by high activity, there will be found at its 
culmination, and among the agencies leading to that culmination, some profound 
cosmological outlook, implicitly accepted, impressing its own type on the current 
springs of action’. 
Christopher Dawson is making the same point when he says that ’behind every 
civilization there is a vision’. (...) Following Whitehead’s lead, I should define 
civilization in spiritual terms. Perhaps it might be defined as an endeavour to create 
a state of society in which the whole of Mankind will be able to live together in 
harmony, as members of a single all-inclusive family. This is, I believe, the goal at 
which all civilizations so far known have been aiming unconsciously, if not 
consciously.”57 
                                                
55 Montagu, p. 46. 
56 Montagu, p. 237. 
57 A Study, one-vol. edition, p. 44. 
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The keyword here seems to me to be ’cosmology’ and the whole idea that our 
conception of the world influences, indeed directs, our actions. Toynbee then 
expresses his belief that harmonious co-living of Humanity is the purpose of 
civilizations. If so, it must certainly still be said to be a work in progress and as a 
definition of what constitutes a ‘civilization’ it seems to me hopelessly vague. It 
doesn’t tell us anything about what a civilization actually is. So can we get any 
clearer on what it means to define civilization ’in spiritual terms’? 
 
“Civilizations are invisible, just as constitutions, states, and churches are, and this 
for just the same reasons. But civilizations, too, have manifestations that are visible, 
like the Prussian state’s gold-crowned eagles and spiked helmets, and like the 
Christian Church’s crosses and surplices. Set side by side an Egyptiac, an Hellenic, 
and a pre-Renaissance Western statue. It will be impossible to mistake which of these 
is the product of which school of sculptors. The distinctiveness of each of the three 
artistic styles is not only visible; it is definite – more definite than any of the visible 
products or emblems of any church or state. By exploring the range, in space and 
time, of a civilization’s distinctive artistic style, one can ascertain the spatial and 
temporal bounds of the civilization that this style expresses. (...)  
The visible works of art that reveal so much about their civilization are merely 
expressions of it. They are not the civilization itself. That remains invisible, like a 
church or a state. When the anthropologist or the cultural historian tries to analyze 
the observable qualities that have been his clues to the diagnosis of a culture, he 
analyses them, as Bagby notices, in terms of ideas and values.”58 
 
So, civilizations are invisible but they have observable manifestations, most notably 
the arts. But what, for Toynbee, is this invisible something which is the civilization? 
It is not clear and the quotation leaves us with at least two possible interpretations. 
The last sentence “… when the anthropologist... tries to analyze the observable 
qualities… of a culture, he analyses them… in terms of values and ideas…” points, 
again, towards the notion of a ‘cosmology’ being the essential part that defines a 
civilization. As I will argue a little later, there are several good reasons to suppose 
                                                
58 A Study, vol. XIII, p. 46. 
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this. However, Toynbee can also be interpreted in another way. The whole idea of the 
arts expressing the essence of a civilization sounds very much like Spengler’s idea 
that a culture’s soul expresses itself in the areas of religion, art, science and politics. 
And to Spengler this soul is something real, a spiritual presence of some sort that 
permeates all of the culture’s manifestations and from which they ultimately 
originate. In other words, a civilization is not just a cosmology existing within the 
skulls of its members, it is something that exists beyond the individuals who are 
members of that civilization. 
Given Toynbee’s religious turn and the way he writes about the arts, he could 
be interpreted as adhering to this view, but I think the most probable answer is that he 
wasn’t clear on it himself. His own vague descriptions of the term – and, as we shall 
see soon, his ambiguity gets even stronger – testify to this. However, it perhaps 
doesn’t pose a major problem since the two views are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. A civilization could be seen as being alive and growing when its cultural 
soul is present in it and/or as long as it has a coherent or partially coherent 
cosmology. It could be seen as breaking down, creating its Universal State (or 
entering into its civilization-phase in Spenglerian terms) when the cultural soul leaves 
the civilization and/or when the cosmology breaks definitively down. 
The idea of a culture/civilization having an actual soul can be fascinating in 
its own right, but it is difficult to work with and still more difficult to prove. So, 
without ruling it out, I will in the following work with an understanding of a 
civilization as being held together by what we could call a shared cosmology. I 
suggest that we understand the nexus of a civilization as being essentially a meta-
narrative, a set of myths that gives meaning and order to the universe and that 
explains the role and purpose of human beings in that universe. Such a shared 
cosmology also defines the primary values and virtues of life, the aspects of human 
nature to be expressed and the ones to be suppressed and overcome, or even denied. 
And through this definition of the nature of the universe, the purpose of human 
existence and the primary values of life, the cosmology also lays out certain tracks of 
development for the civilization, opening some roads and closing others. 
 
In the next paragraph I will investigate further the nature and dynamics of this 
cosmology. For now, given the way Toynbee approaches and works in practise with 
his civilizations in A Study, it seems like a workable definition. Yet there is one more 
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problem. For whether he understands a civilization as being endowed with an actual 
live spiritual presence or whether he understands it as being essentially its 
cosmology, he clearly defines it ’in spiritual terms’. Yet doesn’t this contradict his 
previous claim that the Hellenic Civilization came into being with the political 
creation of the city-states as the reaction to the preceding chaos of the Dark Age, and 
The West with the equally political and social invention of the Feudal System as the 
response to the medieval interregnum? Here he clearly seems to understand the 
civilization in terms of its outer manifestations. 
There may be a simple answer to this apparent contradiction. Namely the fact 
that Toynbee describes the genesis of these civilizations in the first volumes of A 
Study of History which was published in 1934 and at this time he still held a mainly 
scientific outlook on the world. While the one-volume edition of A Study where he 
gives the above quoted definition was published in 1972, long after his life-altering 
mystical experiences. It reflects perhaps also the other discrepancy in his thought 
which we investigated as his ‘religious turn’ in chapter 1, which is the value he – at 
different moments – attribute to the civilizations and the so-called higher religions. In 
the beginning of his life and career, the civilizations are the purpose and flower of 
history and the religions, in the form of chrysalis-churches, serve as midwives for the 
birth of civilizations. While towards the end of his life, after his various mystical 
experiences, this system of valuation is turned upside-down, the civilizations now 
only having a raison d’être at all in so far as they ’minister to the process of religion’.  
The reasoning seems a bit naive and I catch myself smiling when I read it. 
Why exactly is it that either has to receive its raison d’être through its contribution to 
the other’s existence? The turning fortunes of the two protagonists so obviously 
reflect the turn of events and experiences in Toynbee’s own life. Yet there is more to 
this than a mere biographical interpretation. For on a deeper level this whole 
justification of the one’s existence through its contribution to the other’s can also be 
seen as reflecting a deeper schism in the Western psyche. For a thousand years 
medieval Christianity shunned physical life and viewed it essentially as a prison and a 
trial leading to the real and true existence in God’s kingdom, while from the Late 
Middle Ages onwards Western man increasingly delved into matter until he finally 
ejected God and anything spiritual from his account of the universe, leading to the 
extreme materialism that permeates our society today. We still have not found a 
balance, and Toynbee clearly did not either.  
 48 
As should be clear by now, Toynbee is very inconsistent both about defining 
what a civilization is and on the value he attributes to it. On this whole aspect, I 
believe Spengler has a more profound and useful understanding. He sees all the 
cultural expressions – whether political, religious, artistic, scientific or whatever – as 
manifestations of that particular culture’s soul. There is no valuation or judgment of 
one type of expression being better than another. To him the important thing is that an 
expression is a manifestation of that soul, and that is why he abhors the civilization-
phase where, according to him, that soul has left the culture. 
Following this Spenglerian notion, I would define Civilization as being both 
the invisible and the visible: that is both the particular civilization’s cosmology and 
the multifarious cultural manifestations – religious, artistic, political, economic, 
social, scientific, intellectual, etc. – that are coloured by it. We may note here that in 
the life of our two civilizations under treatment the cosmology in both cases came 
first, in the form of a religion. In the case of Western Civilization’s relation to the 
Catholic Church and worldview, this is obvious, that cosmology came first. And at 
the dawn of the Hellenic city-state cosmos in the 9-8th centuries B.C. there also 
already existed a common Hellenic culture and religion, indeed, there did so already 
at the time of the war against Troy if we are to trust Homer, and also if we adhere to 
modern research59. 
If we define civilization in this way, being both its cosmology and the various 
visible cultural expressions, it would mean that we would have to include in a 
civilization’s history the account of the formation of that civilization’s cosmology. In 
the case of The West that would include the account of the formation of the Christian 
church and worldview from the birth of Christ up to the beginning of the post-Dark 
Age society of The West around the year 1000. As we shall see in the following 
section on growth I believe we can even tell significant parts of that story using 
Toynbee’s terms Challenge and Response, and perhaps they even fit better here than 
they do on his subsequent story of the development of The West, which we recounted 
in chapter 2.  
In the case of the Hellenic Civilization this revised notion of what counts as 
being part of a civilization will include the formation of the Olympian Pantheon and 
the Eleusinian Mysteries in the ages preceding maybe even Mycenean society, 
                                                
59 Martin tells us that the origins of Hellenic religion are obscure, but that the Myceneans worshipped 
the gods of Zeus, Hera and Poseidon. Martin, p. 30. 
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although the details of this remain largely obscure. At any rate, in both cases there is 
a long period of gestation of the cosmology before it spawns its own post-Dark Age 
society, organized and inspired along the lines of that cosmology and not merely on 
the structures of the preceding civilization’s Universal State. In the case of The West, 
that formative period lasted a thousand years, approximately the same amount of time 
as the whole active growth phase of our civilization, as related by Toynbee. This way 
of understanding civilizations also means that the Hellenic and Western Civilizations 
actually co-existed in the same geographical area for the better half of a millennium, 
the Hellenic in its outward, practical Universal State-phase and The West in its 
budding formative mainly cosmological form where it was still defining its place in 
(and understanding of) the world. 
With this revised idea of what a civilization is and of what counts as being 
part of its history we can proceed to discuss the nature and importance of the glue that 
keeps it together: The cosmology. 
 
A Civilization’s cosmology – function and dynamics 
 
In this paragraph I will try to penetrate a bit further into the question of what a 
cosmology actually is and the function it performs for a civilization. In doing so, I 
will advance somewhat beyond a mere discussion of Toynbee’s theory, yet it is my 
hope that this attempt in clarifying the function of the cosmology will also shed some 
light on some of a civilization’s developments as they are recounted by Toynbee, for 
instance the creation of its Universal State and the rise of new religions.  
First of all, it should be unmistakably clear how important human beings’ 
values and conception of the world is for their interaction and co-operation. This is a 
recognition that hardly needs any proof. Think of the examples in the recent years 
where a Danish cartoonist and lately an American film ridiculed the prophet 
Mohammed. Do the same thing with Jesus and hardly anyone in The West would 
notice, save perhaps a few modern Christians who might feel offended, but surely 
wouldn’t have a public case. Yet the Muslim world was in uproar. Think of an 
extreme act as the burning of innocent women as witches from the late fifteenth 
century onwards. You obviously don’t do that unless you believe, as those people 
did, that women stood closer to the devil and that things such as magic and evil eyes 
were real and effective. Or think of the 1968 landing on the Moon. One does not 
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undertake such a project if one still believes that the Moon and the other heavenly 
bodies are being dragged across the sky by oxen in a cart or whatever else people 
might have believed to be the case. 
It should be self-evident then that the importance of our understanding of the 
world – the cosmology that we consciously or unconsciously accept – can hardly be 
overestimated. It shapes our actions, our emotions, our understanding of ourselves. It 
is worth stressing because we often end up taking a particular worldview for granted 
when we live under its influence. Having recognized the cosmology’s importance, it 
also makes sense that it originates way before the society that it inspires comes into 
being, since any kind of coordinated action becomes difficult if people do not share 
the same fundamental views and values. I’m sure anyone who has tried to orchestrate 
a complex work process with people from many different cultures can testify to this. 
Things can be explained at times very thoroughly, yet at the end of the day they mean 
different things to different people, or within different worldviews, and different 
actions are the result. If a work situation of that kind can be difficult then imagine 
trying to build a civilization together. It seems reasonable then that the cosmology has 
to come first. 
Can we be more specific about the influence and function that the cosmology 
performs for the civilization? I think we can, and I think it can be said to be important 
in two ways. First, the particularity of the cosmology colours the civilization. It 
allows certain actions and expressions of human nature and denies others, or at least 
valuates and interprets them in different ways. Secondly, the cosmology is what gives 
unity to the civilization. Indeed, I would suggest that it is, in the first many centuries 
at least, what makes it a civilization at all.  
Let us look at the first aspect. The cosmology colours the civilization in 
question, but it should not be understood so that all the civilization’s manifestations 
originate from it – as Spengler would say is the case with the culture’s soul giving 
rise to all that culture’s creations. It is rather that the cosmology gives the various 
cultural expressions a particular flavour. An example can illustrate this. Think of the 
more warlike aspects of human nature. In the cosmologies of our two civilizations 
these aspects are regarded entirely differently. In the Hellenic Civilization a man was 
supposed and encouraged to exhibit all the warrior’s virtues of courage, honour, 
strength and outward aggressiveness. The primary test of his worth was in battle. 
Most of the gods in the Olympic Pantheon were great warriors and the common 
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literary treasure of all Hellenes, The Iliad and The Odyssey, are about great heroes 
and military adventures. The emphasis on warrior virtues in this civilization can 
hardly be overestimated, indeed, they seem to have intrinsic value. In Catholic 
Christianity it was to the contrary – at least in certain parts its history60. Christianity 
deliberately distanced itself from the overt militarism of the Greco-Roman culture. A 
true Christian was supposed to be devoted to God and not to the fight over the petty 
spoils of this world. Yet Christians are also humans and humans have aggressions. 
This was especially the case with the newly Christianized Normans, Viking settlers 
from Scandinavia. So, in short, the crusade was invented, sanctioning violence if it 
served God’s purpose on Earth. The point is, the warlike aspects of human nature find 
their expression in both civilizations, but the value attributed to them and the ways of 
justifying them are entirely different.  
Another example is religious manifestations. The religious impulse is inherent 
in human nature and asserts itself in every civilization. But different cosmologies 
give rise to wholly different rites, rituals, sacraments, offerings, prayers, initiations, 
marriages, funerals, etc. Human nature is human nature, but it is given different 
manifestations depending on the cosmology under which we live. Even when people 
rebel against the cosmology implicitly accepted by their society – and this certainly 
occurs, there have always been dissidents – that cosmology also tends to colour their 
actions in that they become ‘anti-‘ that particular cosmology. As for instance with 
modern science that, being born in a strongly Christian age, has become decidedly 
anti-spiritual. 
 
Secondly, I suggest that beyond colouring the civilization the cosmology really is 
what makes it a civilization at all. Or put in another way, that the body social which 
the pattern identified by Toynbee occurs in is defined by the cosmology shared by its 
members. If we look at our Western Civilization the Christian meta-narrative was our 
original cosmology. Accordingly, during medieval times when that cosmology was 
still whole and intact, all the great philosophers, mystics and cosmology-builders 
generally worked within a Christian framework – one could mention a Peter Abelard, 
a Thomas Aquinas, a William of Ockham, a Dante, a Francis of Assisi. But from the 
                                                
60 It is of course a well-known fact that Christianity in practise has been one of the most violent 
religions to have ever existed on Earth. The point to notice here is not the amount of actual violence, 
but the way violence is perceived and justified, and here there seems to have been a significant 
difference. 
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time of the Protestant Reformation onwards, this begins to change. The great 
cosmology-builders that we remember from the modern age, a Galilei, a Copernicus, 
a Descartes, a Newton, an Einstein do not describe the world in Biblical terms. They 
describe their findings in the emerging language of science.61 
If the cosmology is what gives unity to the civilization, then it is of course a 
dire moment when that cosmology begins to break down. It seems that when this 
happens there emerge a number of attempts to 1) rescue the old cosmology by 
defending it as it is or by integrating new views or discoveries into it, 2) create new 
cosmologies that tend to reuse some of the basic assumptions of the old one and 3) 
recreate unity, not on a cosmological level, but on the outer political, judicial and 
economic level in the form of a Universal State. In other words, if we should define 
the key plot in the life and death of civilizations it might be something as poetic as 
the creation and loss of cosmological unity and the quest to find or re-create that 
unity again, in whatever form. 
Again, if we look at our Western Civilization an example of the first kind of 
attempts would be, for instance, the Counter-Reformation of the Catholic Church 
following the Protestant Reformation. Ironically, Catholic attempts to create a new 
and more accurate calendar may have triggered important parts of the scientific 
revolution62. More recent examples are the various attempts to reconcile the 
discoveries of science with the Biblical Genesis Myth that insists on the creation of 
the universe by the Abrahamic God. Attempts of this kind have developed since the 
18th century, continue to develop and are generally known as ‘Creationism’63. They 
include everything from die-hard fanatics of the medieval Christian cosmology who 
claim that the Earth is only 6000 years old to proponents of, for instance, the theory 
of ‘Intelligent Design’ who more moderately claim that ‘certain features of the 
universe and of living things are best explained by an intelligent cause, not an 
undirected process such as natural selection.’64 Generally, it must be said that none 
                                                
61 It should be said, though, that most of these men were deeply religious and that many of them went 
to the study of nature with the exact purpose of understanding God through his workings in the created 
world. However, even if we admit this gradual historical development of the modern scientific 
worldview and if we admit the ‘positive’ influence of religion on early science, the result of it - the 
modern scientific worldview – and the religious cosmology of the High Middle Ages surely are 
radically different. 
62 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counter-Reformation 
63 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Creationism 
64 Webpage of the Discovery Institute, promoting the theory of Intelligent Design: 
http://www.discovery.org/csc/topQuestions.php#questionsAboutIntelligentDesign 
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of these attempts have acquired anything near the meta-cosmological status on a 
civilizational level enjoyed by the Christian cosmology in the Middle Ages, and thus, 
judged as attempts to recreate unity on a civilizational level in the form of a shared 
cosmology, they have failed. 
The new cosmology that has taken over from the Christian one is, of course, 
science. We turn to science today when we want to know something about the world. 
It was the discoveries of science that dismembered the Christian cosmology and 
erected a scientific one in its stead. The question is: Can science perform the function 
of giving unity to our civilization on a cosmological level like the Christian 
cosmology did? Or will we need to have unity re-imposed on us on the outer level in 
the form of a Universal State? As Toynbee says this third kind of attempt to recreate 
unity in The West has been tried a couple of times, first by Napoleon and then by 
Hitler. Surely we would all like to avoid another attempt along those lines. So could 
science perform the work instead? 
The question of course presumes that it is a cosmology that makes a 
civilization a civilization and that, when it breaks down, there is a longing to recreate 
that unity. But if we accept this, then it is an important question. In our search for an 
answer, we may first notice one more characteristic about a unity-endowing 
cosmology; that such a cosmology can be said to consist of two parts: A descriptive 
part that makes sense of the universe, and a prescriptive part that tells us how to live 
in that universe. In other words, in such a cosmology a meaningful existence, a 
philosophy of life, is derived directly from the account of the nature of the universe 
that human beings inhabit. One’s life and actions are directly and intimately 
connected with the cosmos.  
Such a cosmology brings the macrocosmos and microcosmos together in a 
powerfully coherent whole. In that way, it is unifying in two senses of the word: It 
unites a group of peoples into what we have called a civilization, and it unites the 
lives of human beings with a vision of the grander structure and purpose of the 
cosmos. If we were to put such an understanding of Cosmology on a general formula 
it would be: “The world is X, therefore thou shalt do Y”. Translated into Christian 
terms this would be something on the order of: “God has created the universe and 
has given us his divine revelation, so thou shalt do as he says.”  
Can we put science on a similar formula? It may not be put equally simple, 
but thinking about the matter we do find a number of fundamental assumptions about 
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the world that are shared by probably every scientist in virtually every field and by 
the large majority of Western people today. A few of these most important and 
general assumptions might be formulated as: “The universe is made up of dark matter 
and atoms and stars and galaxies. The Earth is round and certainly not the center of 
the universe. Humans have developed from the apes, making us simply an advanced 
animal, and the whole lot was created 15 billion years ago by a huge blast out of 
nothing.”  
This is of course greatly simplified, but I think the reader will agree with me 
that most Western people today and every living scientist will accept this as self-
evidently true. It is formulated very broadly and that is exactly the point, because we 
are looking here for those very cornerstones of our understanding of the world that 
everybody shares and that we never question. And the above statements are certainly 
among them. But what then? Does science, on the basis of this, tell us how to live? 
Can we derive a philosophy of life from the above formulated creed? The answer is: 
Science does not and we cannot. It reveals the void between the stars, between the 
sub-atomic particles, in human life, but it is up to us to fill that void again. In itself 
science is not a prescriptive cosmology and therefore it cannot direct action. It cannot 
tell us how to live. It needs to be coupled with something else in order to be 
prescriptive, such as an ethical or political philosophy. And given its flexibility, it 
does lend itself readily to several such philosophies. 
Throughout the modern age various ethical and political philosophies have 
been developed that claimed to be based on science, or were presented in a scientific 
language. On the ethical level we could mention the philosophies of consequentialism 
and deontology – apt equivalents of Stoicism and Epicureanism in Hellenistic times. 
On the political and economic level Marxism and capitalism have been the two 
protagonists. Toynbee’s own philosophy of history is an attempt to give meaning to 
world history that also – like Marx before him, but with a very different result – 
claimed to be based on science. The point I want to make here is that, from a 
perspective that considers a cosmology as the essential glue of a civilization, all of 
these various modern philosophies can be interpreted as attempts to complete the 
‘half’ only descriptive cosmology of science. They may be interpreted as attempts to 
add a normative leg to science. 
If we interpret them in this way, then the next question is: Have any of them 
acquired meta-cosmological status today? Many surely haven’t, but it seems fair to 
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say that a combination of democracy, capitalism and civil and human rights has 
become the unquestionable model for the structuring of a society in The West today. 
These are values and ideas that we take virtually for granted.  Much like science, they 
are ideas that we share and which are an integral part of our worldview. We could 
consider to regard this cocktail of ideas together with science as a ‘modern secular 
Western cosmology’. They make sense of the universe, tell us how to live in and 
organize a society, urge us to produce and consume. It is also this cosmology that, 
through the agency of corporate and financial institutions who translate that 
cosmology into practise, is conquering the world in these years. Most countries in the 
world have accepted these Western ideas and are integrating the majority of them into 
their own societies. In that sense, this modern cosmology might be said to form the 
ideological basis for The West’s emerging Universal State.  
The combination of science, democracy and capitalism surely are ideas and 
values that are shared across our civilization. As such, it may also have given our 
civilization some sense of unity again – especially after the defeat of its communist 
and fascist rivals. Yet as a cosmology, I would say that it still fails in one important 
respect. It may, at times, give us the feeling of living in a meaningful and just society, 
but it cannot provide the feeling of living in a meaningful universe. It does not bring 
the macro- and microcosmos together the purposeful way that a religious cosmology 
does. In this way, I think the notion of a cosmology may serve as one possible 
explanation as to why increasing numbers of Westerners today feel attracted to the 
old cosmologies of The East in the various forms that they appear, and thus to the rise 
of new religious and spiritual movements that we have seen in the last 40-50 years. It 
is because there is, deep within the core of what it means to be human, a desire to live 
in a meaningful universe. And the de-spiritualized way of making sense of the world 
and of organizing society that we have developed in The West can, for all its 
successes, never provide that meaning. 
The notion of the cosmology, and its function of giving unity to a civilization, 
could of course be explored much further. It is not the purpose here, however. The 
aim has been simply to show how this concept may contribute to our understanding 
of some of the processes that Toynbee describes and some of the developments that 
we experience in The West today.  
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Answers to parts of the critique 
 
Having explored what lies at the core of a civilization and having argued that this is a 
cosmology, we may use this to provide an answer to some of the points of the critique 
listed in chapter 1. Indeed, this conclusion is itself an answer to the first objection: 
that Toynbee is inconsistent in his definition and usage of the term civilization. He 
certainly is, but he does seem to have an intuitive and practical understanding of it; 
enough to be able to work with it and discern a pattern in it. He also circles around 
the idea of the cosmology even if he never really coins it as the essential thing. In any 
case, given the way he describes and works with his civilizations, and given my 
above investigation of the nature and function of a cosmology, it seems to me that a 
cosmology is a pretty good answer to the question, ‘what defines a civilization’. 
If we agree that what we can call a shared cosmology really is what defines a 
civilization then we can also propose an answer the second point of critique: That is 
does make sense that Toynbee treats Hellas and Rome as being part of the same 
civilization. With a clearer idea of the nature of a cosmology and the function it 
performs for the civilization, we are able to suggest why: because they by and large 
share the same cosmology. 
The cosmology of the Hellenic Civilization originates, obviously, in Hellas, 
but the Romans became from early on ‘converts to Hellenism’ as Toynbee says. This 
is perhaps a somewhat strong formulation, but it is a fact that the Romans were 
heavily influenced by Hellenic culture from early on and embraced it often 
wholeheartedly and matter-of-factly. A few examples of this are, first and foremost, 
the deliberate identification of the Roman deities with the Hellenic ones, the Roman 
historians’ strong inspiration and often structuring of their narratives along the lines 
and style of the Hellenic classics, the iconic status that Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey 
received in Rome just as it had in Hellas, and the Roman myths about being blood-
related to the Spartans65, and about Rome’s founder Aeneas who was one of the 
surviving Trojan heroes and whose mother was Aphrodite. In other words, whether 
the Romans were biologically of Hellenic origin or not, they spun themselves 
thoroughly into the web of Hellenic culture and myths: into the Hellenic cosmology. 
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Rome was even considered Hellenic by the native Hellenes. One thing is for a 
people to identify themselves with another and to consider themselves of their kind. It 
is another for that second people to actually adopt the prospective newcomers and 
regard them as part of their culture. But there is clear evidence that at least some 
Hellenes did. Already in the earliest mention of Rome in extant Greek literature, the 
4th-century Greek scholar Heracleides Ponticus describes her as ’a Hellenic city’66. 
This speaks for itself. Indeed, the cultural difference between Rome and Hellas were 
perhaps not greater than that between the US and Europe today. And clearly we 
would regard both the US and Europe as part of The West with the obvious 
‘homeland’ of our civilization being Europe. Likewise, it makes sense to regard 
Rome and Hellas as being part of the same civilization. And it is, of course, not for 
nothing that that civilization is generally called by the name ‘The Graeco-Roman 
Civilization’. 
Finally, we may give an answer the third point of critique: Toynbee’s 
tendency to pass extremely value-laden judgements about the different phases in a 
civilization’s life and about the different historical actors that comprise it. This is a 
point that resounds in essay after essay treating his system. Few reviewers note this as 
a general point, but attack various manifestations of it, for instance Toynbee’s 
judgement of the Universal State and thus Rome’s role in history. As recounted in 
chapter 2, Toynbee is generally not favourable towards the Universal State. He sees it 
as a temporary remedy to halt the already inevitable disintegration of a dying 
civilization and as a time when growth has essentially ceased to occur. At best, the 
Universal State is the womb out of which emerges a new higher religion. However, it 
should be said that in his later writings Toynbee was not as unequivocal in his 
judgements of the Universal State. He thought it absolutely paramount that our own 
civilization managed to create one in order to avoid certain ruin. 
Valuations of it aside, the term Universal State seems useful. Rome does 
bring about the political unification of the area conquered by Hellenic culture and 
arms, it does emerge as the sole surviving state out of the chaos of centuries of war, 
and it does provide lasting peace and a working framework for the mixture of cultures 
and religions for centuries thereafter – just as Universal States do according to 
Toynbee’s description. He then has some very strong and shifting opinions on the 
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value of it, but my point is that we need not follow him in any of his shifting 
judgments. We may simply note that there is something that we can call a Universal 
State originating at a specific moment in the history of a civilization, being a 
reunification of it at a time when it has lost its original inner coherence, and then 
leave the valuations of it to those who feel they need to have a qualitative opinion on 
it. The important thing to recognize is that Rome performs this role for a magnified 
Hellenic culture and that the emergence of a Universal State is a crucial part of the 
life cycle of this civilization.  
The same approach I think can be applied to Toynbee’s much criticized 
’religious turn’. As we have seen, this turn causes Toynbee to assign prime value to 
the ’higher religions’ being the purpose and flower of all of history. Whereas before, 
they were simply serving as mid-wives for history’s then flower and purpose: the 
civilizations. Now, his first interpretation was widely accepted and attracted no 
significant criticism. The second, however, assigning primary importance to the 
religions at the cost of the civilizations (and writing off the whole range of tertiary 
civilizations, including The West, as useless repetitions of the civilizational cycle in 
so far as they did not create any new higher religions) did not fare well in a scientific 
age. Toynbee was accused of having ’gone soft’, and one of his more mocking critics 
called him the prophet of a new ’mish-mash religion’.67 
Again, the whole discussion of Toynbee’s religious turn is a big one and 
probably the one that has been most instrumental in diverting minds from an actual 
fruitful discussion of the deeper machinations of his system. For whether one assigns 
primary importance to one or the other, it is evident that there is a relationship 
between religions and civilizations. Surely, once it had survived the Colosseum and 
the various pogroms in the first centuries the early Christian Church benefited 
immensely from existing within the framework of the Roman Empire, which 
provided both the peace and the necessary infrastructure for the Christian 
missionaries to reach the farthest corners of the Empire preaching the word of God68. 
Needless to say, it benefited even more once it had conquered the imperial 
administration and had been declared state religion. On the other hand, as shown in 
the previous discussion on the nature of a civilization, the Christian Church’s 
function in preparing the ground for the subsequent society of The West is 
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incontestable. The Church and the Christian cosmology came first and after the Dark 
Age a new medieval society developed along Christian lines. 
The point is, pure and simple, that there is a relationship between religions 
and civilizations. And again, we need not, as Toynbee does, give one importance over 
the other. We can simply note the function that they perform for each other at various 
times and note that these functions seem to be repeated at the ’philosophically 
contemporary’ moments in the history of the two civilizations. (The cosmology 
existed before the emergence out of the Dark Age of the society of both the Hellenic 
Civilization and The West, and regarding the flood of new religions into the Roman 
Empire we are, as argued in chapter 2, experiencing the seeming beginning of a 
similar process today in The West). In summery, the two most serious criticisms of 
Toynbee’s value-laden judgments do not seem to impinge significantly on the deeper 
machinations of his system. 
 
The Notion of Growth 
 
The notion of growth and how it occurs in civilizations is one of the parts of 
Toynbee’s system that has received the severest critique. And there are generally 
good reasons for this. But for all the criticism no one, not even Pieter Geyl69 who was 
one of Toynbee’s sharpest critics on particularly the growth question, ever seems to 
question the assumption that there exist civilizations and that they grow. In this part, I 
will try to investigate if we can get any clearer on what that means. In particular, I 
will suggest a new understanding of growth that can account for some of the obvious 
cases of it that Toynbee leaves out. Finally, I will consider if we can use this extended 
understanding of growth in our search for possible recurring patterns in Hellenism 
and The West.  
Let us recall for a moment what Toynbee tells us about growth. Growth, he 
says, is new political, social or economic inventions conjured up by creative 
minorities as a response to a challenge facing the civilization as a whole. Through the 
process of mimesis the uncreative masses then copy the successful creations of these 
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minorities. Toynbee stipulates that the creative responses are worked out through the 
process of withdrawal and return whereby the minority, in the form of a creative 
individual, group or state, somehow withdraws from the life of the wider civilization 
to experiment with its creative work in seclusion. The new creations should be 
counted as growth, he says, if they enhance the self-determination of the civilization 
in question, giving an ever greater command over the physical environment and thus 
increasingly making the civilization a master of its own fate, and if, over the long run, 
the challenges etherialize: that is they to a still greater extent manifest within the 
growing body of the civilization plus become of a more moral and spiritual nature. 
Now, there are basically two different questions to keep in mind here. The 
first: What is growth at all for a thing and what should be counted as growth? The 
second: How does growth occur? To the first we may level the objection that the 
definition of what is considered growth is too narrow: that growth certainly happens 
in other fields than the political, social and economic ones. To the second question we 
may level the objection that even within these fields there are crucial new inventions 
that affect the civilization as a whole and which surely ought to be regarded as 
growth, yet Toynbee does not count them as such, apparently because they don’t fit 
with his theory of how growth occurs. To this we can add that his own examples of 
growth ought indeed to be recognized as such, though many of them also do not 
follow his description of the growth process.  
 
Growth is more 
 
Let us begin with an expansion of Toynbee’s notion of growth. It seems greatly 
inadequate to limit growth only to political, social and economic inventions. Also 
when we look to Toynbee’s own criteria that growth should contribute to the self-
determination of the civilization. What then about growth in religious ideas? 
Consider, for instance, Augustine’s De Civitate Dei. This work more than any other 
helped in establishing the Christian cosmology which, as we discussed in the 
previous paragraph, has been the essential thing which kept Western Civilization 
together – indeed, made it a unified body at all – until a few centuries ago. Should 
this not be counted as growth? And what of developments of an intellectual and 
technological kind? What of the advent of science? Surely, this more than anything 
has contributed to the self-determination of The West. Even growth in the field of art 
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could be seen as contributing to this self-determination. The development of the 
distinctive artistic style that Toynbee more than anything else sees as an expression of 
the civilization, if that resonates with people throughout the civilization giving them a 
feeling of a shared culture and identity, surely that will contribute to the civilization’s 
sense of itself and to its unity. Is that not growth?  
In short, I think we should enlarge our conception of growth to include any 
new cultural creation, whether it is of a social, political, economic, artistic, 
intellectual, technological or spiritual/religious nature. And perhaps it will prove 
useful to distinguish between cultural and civilizational growth. Cultural growth 
would be any new creation within the above mentioned fields. Such new inventions, 
of course, happen all the time and some of them will obviously have much greater 
impact than others. Some wither away almost before they have been born. Others 
become so successful that they spread throughout the entire civilization in one form 
or another and become a common heritage. It is these last ones that Toynbee seems to 
warrant as cases of growth and these that I would suggest labelling civilizational 
growth.  
The distinction is important because many critics of Toynbee seem to feel that 
he downplays many of the cultural achievements of our civilization, which he does at 
times. My point is that he has his gaze fixed on the civilizations and from that 
perspective many of these cultural achievements may be regarded as irrelevant. But I 
don’t think he would deny that many of these achievements should be regarded as 
cultural growth according to the above definition. In any case, as argued above, even 
when it comes to civilizational growth there surely are also examples of this in areas 
that Toynbee does not mention. 
 
Growth occurs in many ways – not just through Challenge and Response 
 
So far so good, but the oddity of Toynbee’s notion of growth is not yet accounted for. 
For even in the fields where he claims to find growth there are conspicuous examples 
of it that he does not regard as such. One telling example70 from his own account in 
Hellenism will suffice. It concerns the invention of coinage in some of the Hellenic 
city-states in Asia Minor in about 650 B.C. This invention has a profound effect on 
                                                
70 that we touched upon in chapter 2. 
 62 
the rest of Hellenic society in that it enables the creation of an organized loan market 
which ruins many of the free small holders. This again contributes to social tension 
and ultimately the revolutions which replaced the aristocracy in most of the Hellenic 
poleis. In terms of its effect, the fact that it is an economic invention that spreads 
throughout the Hellenic civilization, it surely ought to count as an example of growth, 
according to Toynbee’s own criteria. However, he does not regard it as such. Is it 
simply because it doesn’t happen as a response to any challenge? At least Toynbee 
doesn’t mention any challenge so we must assume this to be the missing element. But 
who would deny that an invention as important as that of minted metal should be 
considered growth? Both cultural and in this case because of its impact also 
civilizational growth according to the above made distinction. It seems unreasonable 
to let the one missing element of a definable challenge rule out the invention of 
coinage from the portfolio of growth. 
Regarding Toynbee’s own examples of growth in the Hellenic Civilization, 
they generally seem to lend themselves to the interpretation of being a response to 
some kind of challenge. It seems plausible to regard the chaos of the Hellenic Dark 
Age as a challenge out of which emerged the political response of the creation of the 
city-states. Toynbee’s classic example to illustrate the growth dynamic, the 
Malthusian challenge of over-population in Hellas and various city-states’ different 
responses, also seems generally persuasive. So do the obvious challenges of 
Phoenician and Etruscan competition in the sixth century and the Persian invasion in 
the fifth. And the international anarchy and chronic warfare in the Hellenic world in 
the last centuries B.C. surely can also be seen as the political challenge that found its 
solution in the Roman Empire71. But regarding Western Civilization, Challenge and 
Response seems useful in explaining Toynbee’s own examples of growth to a 
somewhat lesser degree. It seems like a plausible explanation to the emergence of the 
medieval feudal society as a response to the chaos of the medieval Dark Age to a 
similar extent as its Hellenic counterpart, the creation of the city-states out of the 
Dark Age preceding that civilization. It also seems very reasonable to see the constant 
threat of nuclear warfare during the Cold War as a challenge that necessitated a 
political response along the lines of closer international relations and cooperation, a 
response that seems to have largely manifested in the host of international institutions 
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founded during, precisely, the Cold War. But when it comes to the various cultural 
creations of the Italian city-states of the Renaissance and to the adaptations of those 
creations to the medieval European feudal kingdoms – Toynbee’s chapters 2 and 3 in 
the history of The West – what were exactly the challenges that prompted these 
developments? Toynbee is quite imprecise concerning the details of this when 
treating these chapters of growth. Regarding the 3rd chapter, for instance, he writes 
that “… the problem was to discover how the new Italian and Flemish way of life 
could be lived, on the kingdom-state scale, by the Western World as a whole.”72 It 
isn’t clear why that was a challenge and it does not get much better elsewhere in the 
text. On the other hand, no one would deny that the cultural creations of Renaissance 
Italy and the invention of representative, parliamentary democracy in Britain and the 
subsequent industrial revolution are among the most important and ingenious 
examples of cultural and civilizational growth in The West. So seemingly, even 
Toynbee’s own examples of growth cannot all be completely accounted by Challenge 
and Response. 
In conclusion then, Challenge and Response is in many ways an illuminating 
concept when working with the growth and development of civilizations. As Rune 
Larsen has pointed out it is also the Toynbeean term that has become most widely 
incorporated in the general vocabulary of historians, but it cannot account for all 
cases of growth. Not even all of Toynbee’s own examples and surely not when we 
expand our notion of growth as we did in the preceding paragraph. It may for instance 
be difficult to locate any particular challenge prompting growth and development 
within the arts. What challenge made Rembrandt or Picasso develop their distinctive 
styles? I don’t know, but surely they should be considered cultural growth. 
We may note in passing that Toynbee’s further description of the growth 
process with the term Withdrawal and Return encounters even greater problems. Of 
an already severely criticized growth concept this was the part that took the heaviest 
blow. It is treated in most detail by Pieter Geyl in his essay Toynbee’s System of 
Civilizations73, and Toynbee tellingly skipped the term all-together in his revised one-
volume version of A Study from 1972. That said, it seems obvious that new cultural 
creations are virtually always developed by certain creative minorities, only then to 
be dispersed within the wider civilization. Indeed, the new creation has to originate 
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somewhere. And intuitively at least, it seems plausible that sometimes new creations 
have to be developed in some form of seclusion. In any case though, I think it would 
be a false track to turn the way growth occurs into a criteria for its being growth or 
not. Following that line, I think we can likewise dispose of Toynbee’s idea of 
etherialization as a criterion for growth being growth. First of all, it is incredibly 
vague, and Toynbee’s own examples do not always follow such a process either. If 
etherialization means that the challenges over time come less and less from the outer, 
physical surroundings and more and more originate within the body of the growing 
civilization itself, then why do the painfully physical challenges of the outer, hostile 
enemies of Etruscans, Phoenicians and invading Persians come after the Malthusian 
challenge that developed within the body of the Hellenic Civilization itself? As a 
criterion of growth in Toynbee’s elaborate description of that concept etherialization 
can be safely discarded.  
 
Towards a new notion of growth and its usefulness for our inquiry 
 
To sum it up, I suggest that we view cultural growth as any new cultural creation, it 
being of a social, political, economic, artistic, intellectual, technological or 
spiritual/religious kind. Some of these creations do indeed originate as a response to a 
challenge. Some as a response to a challenge facing the whole of the civilization. 
Some even through what might in some cases be said to be a process of withdrawal 
and return by a given minority. But certainly many do not occur as a response to any 
challenge, not even a local one. They simply occur because their creators get inspired, 
for whatever reason, and they certainly do not always withdraw or return in any 
discernible way. Some of these creations then over time become so successful that 
they become a common heritage for the whole of the civilization, changing it for 
good. In that case, I suggest that they should be labelled as cases of civilizational 
growth.  
The next question is what we can use this new notion of growth for. Can we 
use it in our investigation for recurring patterns in our two civilizations? I think we 
actually may make a general observation to this effect. First, however, there is 
another thing we can use it for. We can combine it with our enlarged idea of what a 
civilization is and then we can use it to tell the story of the growth of the 
civilization’s cosmology. As I have mentioned before, Challenge and Response 
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actually seems to be a useful term here. In the case of the Hellenic Civilization, 
however, we unfortunately have insufficient knowledge to tell that story. But in the 
case of The West, we can. 
In the following then, I will outline very briefly what could be taken to be the 
main chapters in the history of the formation of the Christian cosmology. The 
purpose is to show how Challenge and Response – even if it cannot account for all 
cases of growth – may be illuminating also in fields that Toynbee did not consider. 
After that I will return to the other potential use of our new notion of growth. 
 
In the history of the formation of the Christian cosmology the first chapter could be 
seen as the challenge of presenting the teachings of Jesus the Jew within the 
framework of a dominant Hellenic culture. This is a primarily intellectual and cultural 
challenge, and Paul, a Hellenized Jew, is instrumental in its response. What emerges 
as the product of this process is Christianity, significantly altered from its origins 
from having gone through the Hellenic filter. For instance, the idea that God 
incarnates as a human being is blasphemy in Judaism, while in the Hellenic myths it 
happens all the time. 
The second chapter could be seen as the challenge of worshipping or not 
worshipping the emperor. If the early Christians had sold out on this key element they 
would have lost the claim to monotheism which is absolutely essential to their 
religion. Christianity might then never have had its subsequent proliferation and 
success. On the other hand, if they took up the challenge they risked annihilation. 
They chose to face it and the martyrs died for it in Colosseum and in the various 
pogroms in the first centuries. Their ultimate victory and successful response to that 
challenge could be seen as the conversion of that very seat of power that had 
demanded their worship. 
Chapter 3. In 410 Rome is plundered by the Visigoths, first time in 800 years 
that the city has fallen to a foreign invader. Choruses of criticism rise against 
Christianity, alleging that the disaster is the revenge of the ancient gods for the 
Romans having abandoned them. A rather intellectual challenge that receives a highly 
intellectual answer in the form of Augustine’s De Civitate Dei. Augustine forcefully 
repudiates the criticism and at the same time carves out the Christian conception of 
World History, which was to become the standard model for all Christian historical 
writing in the next thousand years and a cornerstone in the Christian cosmology: a 
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tremendous cosmological achievement and one of the most important works in the 
establishment of the Christian worldview. 
Chapter 4. The fall of Rome. Christianity had conquered Rome and then 
Rome was conquered by the barbarians. All that the Christians had won were in 
danger of being lost. This challenge was mainly met through peaceful conversion of 
the invading barbarians. It could be said to be overcome when a Christian 
Charlemagne reunited a large part of Europe and was crowned Holy Roman Emperor. 
Soon after that, the second line of barbarians ushered in, the next challenge out of 
which emerged the new Christian post-Dark Age society that Toynbee calls Western 
Civilization. 
 
These are of course only an ultra quick touch on some of the major developments in 
Christianity in the first thousand years of its existence. There are many more and they 
are much more complex. However, each of them are vital and the point is that 
Challenge and Response do seem to be a useful concept in shedding some light on 
their dynamics and origin. 
The other potential use of our new notion of growth is whether it can be used 
in the identification of any recurring patterns in the life of our two civilizations. 
Clearly, as Toynbee also notes, the growth process is characterized by differentiation 
and variety, and since we have now also discarded the at least somewhat orderly 
progression of Challenge and Response, it may seem futile to look for any recurring 
pattern in the process of growth. Yet again, if we consider the idea of a cosmology’s 
role in giving unity to a civilization we may be able to make a very general 
observation. 
It seems that, in the strongly religious period that follows after the civilization 
comes out of its Dark Age, lasting roughly until the time of the Protestant 
Reformation in The West (ca. 1000-1500) and till the emergence of the nature 
philosophers in Ancient Greece (ca. 9th-6th centuries B.C.), much of the growth in the 
different cultural fields work together in creating, upholding and developing a shared 
cosmology, that is maintaining the cosmological unity of the civilization. For 
instance, as we recounted when discussing the cosmology, the great philosophers and 
cosmology-builders of these periods work within the framework of the established 
religious cosmology and the arts are dedicated to representing the inner world of that 
religion. The great works of architecture of this period are churches and temples, and 
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every cultural field is strongly coloured by the religion. After the first breakdown, 
however, there is a gradual change. Growth certainly still occurs in all of these 
different fields, but they gradually detach themselves from the religiously oriented 
cosmology and begin to pursue goals of their own. Philosophy pursues alternative 
ways of understanding the universe, increasingly independent of religious ideas. The 
arts detach themselves from religious motives and finally become abstract (in The 
West). Architecture diverts its attention from churches and temples to city planning, 
aqueducts, parliaments, apartment blocks and skyscrapers. In other words, there is 
lots of growth, and although the creations from the many cultural fields may be 
shared across the civilization and may thus give an outer impression of unity, its inner 
coherence may still be disappearing. Some growth, for instance in science, actively 
dismembers that inner coherence as it existed in the religious cosmology. Finally, to 
create unity anew, the Universal State is created. But, as we discussed previously, 
that also cannot provide that ultimate purpose of existence that was provided by the 
religious cosmology. So people again begin to search for new and old cosmologies 
that can put some degree of meaning and coherence back into a fragmented world. 
If we should sum it up in one sentence, we might say that growth in all the 
different cultural fields in the first half of the life of the post-Dark Age society tends 
to support the religious cosmology, while in the latter half of that society’s life 
growth tends to gradually work away from the cosmology, at times actively causing 
its destruction. In summary then, Toynbee’s notion of growth is in itself not very 
helpful in defining recurring patterns in our two civilizations. But with the revised 
understanding of growth and the idea of a cosmology being the core of a civilization, 
we may suggest a general pattern as outlined above. 
 
Time of Troubles vs. the Expansion-breakdown-model74 
 
We come now to the last part of Toynbee’s system to be treated in detail in this 
thesis. It is Toynbee’s concept Time of Troubles. He seems, to my mind, to have a 
point with this notion. It does seem as if there is a period in a civilization’s life where 
the main opponents cease being barbarians or other civilizations and instead become 
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warring states within that civilization itself. And the wars do escalate in scale and 
brutality, both because they are being waged by still larger political units 
commandeering ever more resources, and perhaps also due to a progressive 
breakdown in the standard of behaviour in war. It does seem that during the last 
phases of a Time of Troubles nothing is holy: whole cities like Carthage and Corinth 
being razed to the ground, their inhabitants savagely butchered and the remaining few 
carried off to slavery. And the deliberate, systematic bombing of civilian cities during 
World War II, with Hiroshima and Nagasaki as apt equivalents of Carthage and 
Corinth, certainly makes our modern world live up to the Times of Troubles of the 
past. 
However, as cruel and deplorable as this is, it is not the only aspect of this 
later part of our civilizations’ history. The Time of Troubles of the Hellenic 
Civilization is also the time that sees the establishment of all the four great Hellenic 
philosophical schools and the establishment of the Library in Alexandria, the first 
international community of scholars in the ancient world with the declared aim of 
gathering all knowledge then in existence. It sees continuous developments within the 
arts, sculpture, theatre, poetic and historical writing. The Time of Troubles of our 
Western Civilization has seen the development of modern science. It has birthed 
breathtaking pieces of art, it has seen classical music reaching its zenith and it has, as 
Toynbee rightly observes, seen the ancient city-state-scale democracy brought to 
new, durable form within the modern nation-states. All these examples are 
achievements that we should consider growth according to the discussion in the 
previous paragraph. Moreover, both the Hellenic and the Western Civilizations have 
in these ages seen the vast expansion of their cultural sphere of influence, which of 
course may be said to have been both for good and for bad. 
So, can we find a more nuanced way of conceptualizing this age than the 
gloomy Time of Troubles with its uneven focus on war? I believe we can. The 
escalating wars between still fewer and larger political units are not the only pattern 
that can be discerned in this period. I believe that there can – for our two civilizations 
in question – be discerned a larger pattern of which these wars are part. I call it the 
’Expansion-breakdown-model’ or for short the ’Expansion-model’. Each cycle of 
expansion and breakdown seems to occur three times from the centuries before the 
Time of Troubles until the erection of the Universal State.  
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Let us outline it in general terms first. It seems that when the civilization has 
reached its first stable form, coming successfully out of the challenge of chaos in the 
interregnum or Dark Age, it begins to expand. This expansion is carried out by the 
multitude of political units that the civilization consists of at this moment and it 
continues for some centuries, until it is brought to a halt which seems to cause some 
kind of conflict within the civilization. Then there is a consolidation phase taking 
place, with the civilization gradually forming into two opposing power blocks. At one 
point there is a major confrontation – Toynbee’s first rout or breakdown – in both 
cases after some ideological break or fundamental estrangement has occurred. Out of 
the debris of this first conflagration a Second Wave of Expansion follows, carried out 
by and resulting in fewer and larger political powers than the wave preceding it. After 
some centuries the second conflagration takes place in a series of all-out wars, 
Toynbee’s second rout or breakdown. After this, all the combatants are worsted and 
one state only remains supreme, now embarking on the Third Wave of Expansion. 
This is followed by a Third Breakdown – with the difference that this time the wars 
are to a less extent waged between contending states, because one is now clearly 
dominant. Instead it takes the form of civil wars, social upheaval and change of the 
political system in that dominant state and in the civilization at large. When the 
dominant state is consolidated again in its new form it has emerged as Toynbee’s 
Universal State and hereafter, expansion is limited. 
 
First Wave of Expansion 
 
Let us see how this pattern applies to the Hellenic and the Western Civilizations. In 
the Hellenic Civilization, we have as the First Wave of Expansion the Hellenes 
colonizing the shores of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean during the 8-6th 
centuries B.C, after the Hellenic city-state cosmos had emerged from the preceding 
Dark Age. In the Expansion-model this will then correspond to the Christian 
Crusades the majority of which falls between the end of the 11th and the end of the 
13th century in the Christian era, where Christian knights ventured out to re-conquer 
the Holy Lands and succeeded in establishing temporary kingdoms in and around 
Jerusalem. To this wave of expansion should also be added the Reconquista which 
started a couple of centuries before the Crusades and whereby Christian princes over 
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several centuries gradually re-conquered the Iberian Peninsula from Moorish Muslim 
rulers. 
Both these waves of expansion have a commonality in that they were carried 
out over a couple of centuries by forces from many different political units. In Hellas 
it was the numerous city-states primarily from the European mainland and in 
Christian Europe it was the multitude of feudal kingdoms and principalities, with a 
strong predominance of Normans in the first crusades. Differences are that the 
Christian crusaders in theory had a common declared goal – the conquest of the Holy 
Lands for Western Christianity – although they often strayed away from this, as with 
the massacre of the Jews in central Europe during the First Crusade and the conquest 
and sack of Orthodox Christian Constantinople in 1204. The Hellenes some two 
millennia prior certainly all went out to conquer and colonize, but they never went 
out as a united force with a declared common purpose. Instead, the primary driving 
force behind the Hellenic expansion was the need to disseminate the population 
surplus while for the Crusaders it was a primarily religious motivation. However in 
both cases, the effect was a spread in the influence of their civilization.  
Finally, we can take account of the difference in success of the two waves. 
The areas colonized by the Hellenes in this period pretty much remained within the 
body of the Hellenic Civilization for the rest of its history. On the contrary, the 
Crusader kingdoms in the Holy Land were short-lived and lasted at most a couple of 
hundred years. The most notable success was in Spain where the Muslims where 
driven out for good from most of their strongholds during this period. The significant 
difference in success can probably be explained by the character of the adversaries 
that the aggressors encountered. The Hellenes met mostly culturally backward 
peoples or even vacant spaces where they created their colonies. The Crusaders on 
the other hand challenged a well-organized high culture like their own and thus met 
with considerably greater resistance. Accordingly, when in the end of the period the 
Hellenes were confronted with the combined opposition from the high culture of the 
Etruscans and Phoenicians their advance was equally halted. And when the European 
colonial powers in their Second Wave of Expansion overseas encountered only tribal 
societies or high cultures with hopelessly inferior weapons and morale they expanded 
over most of the surface of the Earth. 
Before the First Breakdown following the First Wave of Expansion there can 
be observed another similarity. The Etruscans and Phoenicians backed by the rising 
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Persian Empire brought the expansion of the Hellenes to a halt by the in the end of 
the 6th century. Toynbee in my opinion rightly sees this (the fact that the internal 
pressure can no longer be diffused by exporting the population surplus) as 
contributing to the internal social and political strife taking place during the 6th 
century and leading to a change in regime from aristocracy to oligarchy and 
democracy in most Hellenic city-states. Likewise, the increasing resistance met by 
the Crusaders could be seen as having contributed to growing strife within the body 
of Western Christendom, not in the form of class struggle and regime change, but in 
the form of the recurring wars between the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire 
during the 13th century. In other words, the idea would be that when the expansion is 
checked it instead leads to convulsions within the expanding civilization. 
After this halting of the expansion, both civilizations meet with a powerful 
alien adversary. In the early 5th century B.C. we have the Persian Wars where the 
Hellenes just about manage to stave off the immense Persian army commanded by 
King Darius and Xerxes successively. The equivalent for Western Christendom could 
be seen as the rise of the Ottoman Empire in the 15th century, which captures 
Constantinople in 1453 and thereafter puts severe pressure on the rest of Southeast 
and Central Europe. The Ottomans come as far laying siege to Vienna twice, in 1529 
and 1683, each time unsuccessful. 
 
First Breakdown 
 
Before the first wars of the Time of Troubles there occurs what we might term a 
Schism in the Inner Life of the Civilization. In the Hellenic case, an ideological 
estrangement develops between Athens and Sparta, who share the same general 
culture and worship the same gods as the rest of the Hellenes. As we have seen in the 
previous chapter their respective reactions to a common challenge set them off in the 
direction towards two completely different – and mutually opposing – ways of life: 
the Spartans move towards a militarily potent but highly conservative oligarchic 
regime, including even the archaic and peculiar institution of a dual kingship; a way 
of life where the expression of the diversity of human nature is denied to the 
Spartans, the only profession permitted to them being war, and this entire way of life 
being sustained only through the subjugation and enslavement of their fellow 
Hellenic neighbours, the Messeniens. Athens on the other hand embodies a creative, 
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flamboyant, risk-willing spirit, including every freeborn male citizen in the governing 
of their city and giving birth to all the diverse celebrated cultural achievements within 
commerce, architecture, philosophy and art, all of which were forbidden to the 
Spartans. In seems probable at least that the conflict between the two cities that 
exploded in the Peloponnesian War (431-404) was not merely a conflict over the 
protection of political and economic interests in the Hellenic world, but also 
fundamentally a struggle between opposing ways of life. It might thus be interpreted 
as a sign of a growing fissure within the Hellenic cosmology. From about a century 
before we see the first Hellenic philosophers beginning to question the reality and 
usefulness of the Olympic gods, thoughts which led to the development of early 
forms of ‘science’ in the Hellenistic Period. 
If we are right in assuming that the diverging roads of development that 
Athens and Sparta took were part of the reason for the ensuing conflict, then the 
obvious parallel in Christian Europe is the Reformation. This is a point that doesn’t 
need much elaboration. The Protestant Reformation drove an ideological cleft 
through Europe which never healed and which led directly to the religious wars of the 
16th and 17th centuries, culminating in the Thirty Years War of 1618-48. As things 
developed these wars became fuelled with territorial and political concerns, yet the 
religious issue was the trigger. According to Toynbee the Peloponnesian War and the 
religious wars in Europe were the First Breakdowns of these civilizations, but as 
suggested I will argue that there in both cases was a breakdown or a gradual and 
fundamental estrangement occurring on the cosmological level even before. 
The course of development of the strife and the wars in this First Breakdown 
were somewhat reversed in the two civilizations. In the Hellenic it started with the 
cataclysm of the Peloponnesian War. Thereafter the political situation in Hellas 
through most of the 4th century was characterized by continuous warfare, strife and 
shifting alliances. On the contrary, the Reformation precipitated first a series of 
mostly local, although still very violent, conflicts between different religious or social 
groups, which then over a century escalated into the Thirty Years War engulfing 
almost all of Europe. So in the Hellenic case the all-out war happens in the beginning 
of the First Breakdown period, whereas in the Western case it happens in the end. 
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Second Wave of Expansion 
 
In Hellas this first bout of systemic strife ended with Philip of Macedon’s conquest 
and federation of all the Hellenic city-states on the European mainland, except Sparta, 
into the League of Corinth in 337 B.C.. Philip was assassinated in the following year 
and it was left to his son, Alexander the Great, after some initial campaigns in Hellas 
to keep the league together, to lead an expeditionary force of Macedonians and 
Hellenes against the Persian Empire in 334. In the next 10 years Alexander’s armies 
conquered the entire Persian Empire including Egypt, vast tracts of Central Asia and 
parts of Northwest India, spreading the culture and dominance of Hellenism 
throughout this entire area. This Second Wave of Expansion of Hellenism is carried 
out with a speed and success that hardly finds any parallel in history. In terms of 
vigour and dynamism and also in terms of the myth Alexander managed to create 
around himself a fitting parallel could be Napoleon, although Napoleon’s principal 
role was not to expand the Western cultural sphere of influence, but to make war on 
his neighbours. In so far as Rome at this point could be said to be a proponent of 
Hellenism, as Heracleitus Ponticus suggests75, we may also add Rome’s conquest of 
central Italy in this period to the Second Wave of Expansion. Carthage was at this 
point the other strong power in the Western Mediterranean that collided with the 
others in the Second Breakdown, but Carthage probably did not take part in the 
Hellenic cosmology to the same degree that Rome did – although they surely must 
have been influenced by it – being as it were a colony founded by the Phoenicians.
 Alexander dies shortly after his great campaign and about 50 years of war 
ensue between his generals, greatly fuelled by the gold from the Persian Empire. 
Around 275 B.C. a balance of power emerges with four strong states: The Antigonid 
dynasty in Macedon and central Greece, the Ptolemies in Egypt, the Seleucid dynasty 
in the main areas of the former Persian Empire, and the small Attalid Kingdom in 
Anatolia. There also emerged an Indo-Hellenic Kingdom in Bactria of which not 
much in known. All of these kingdoms strongly encouraged emigration of Hellenes 
and Macedonians to fill their armies, serve as officers in their administrations and 
populate the new cities they founded. This led to the further spread of Hellenic 
                                                
75 See chapter 3, under Answers to parts of the critique. 
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culture in these areas and the period from Alexander’s death to the final Roman 
conquest of Ptolemaic Egypt in 31 B.C. is generally known as the Hellenistic Period.  
The rulers of these Hellenistic kingdoms competed in many ways and not 
only militarily. They also attempted to make their kingdoms attractive to live in in 
order to attract the so favoured Hellenic and Macedonian emigrants. Thus these rulers 
did much to turn their main cities into centers of learning, research, culture and art, 
with Egyptian Alexandria and its renowned library being perhaps the most famous of 
the period. So although frequent clashes still occurred between the main kingdoms, 
this was also a period that saw new developments and growth within various cultural 
fields. 
In the case of the West the Second Wave of Expansion was carried out by the 
maritime European colonial powers. This wave begins with Portugal and Spain 
slightly before the Reformation and continues steadily during the following 
breakdown. When peace is concluded in Europe in 1648 at the end of the Thirty 
Years War, energies are released primarily for The Netherlands, England and France 
to sail out and compete overseas with each other and with the powers of the Iberian 
Peninsula. The colonies established in the New World secede from their founding 
countries after a couple of centuries, thus achieving a status similar to that of the 
ancient Greek colonies in the Mediterranean to their mother cities two millennia 
before. After that the European powers look to the old world and the colonization of 
India, Southeast Asia and later “The Scramble for Africa” take on speed. In the latter 
half of the 19th century Germany and Italy emerge as modern nation-states and join 
the race, thus completing the consolidation of the European nation-states that end up 
clashing together in the last cataclysm of the Second Breakdown. In this period, the 
colonial powers and nation-states are also the political framework around the cultural 
growth that Europe exhibits in the modern age. 
There are several differences between these Second Expansion Waves. First 
we can note that in the Hellenic case the expansion was carried out mainly by one 
state, Macedonia, (and to some extent Rome) and only afterwards did Alexander’s 
empire split up in the rival successor-states. In the Western case the expansion was 
carried out by states that existed before the expansion and which would continue to 
exist when the colonies had ultimately been lost. The time of the expansion is also of 
a stunning difference. The expansion of Alexander happened in a mere ten years (and 
then, of course, with the gradual immigration of Hellenes and Macedonians 
 75 
afterwards) whereas the Western colonial expansion took place over more than 400 
years. When we look at the form the expansion took there is another interesting 
difference. We may distinguish between expansion carried out primarily through 
military campaign or through colonization. Alexander’s expansion was carried out 
through an astonishing military campaign, thus resembling more the Crusaders of the 
first Western wave than the European colonial powers of the second, and both 
Alexander’s campaign and those of the Crusaders gave rise to kingdoms rather than 
colonies. Kingdom is here to be understood as a sovereign state established through 
conquest over an already existing and functioning society and being politically 
independent of the homeland of the conquerors, whereas a colony is a newly founded 
and populated area or city that at least at first tends to be politically subjugated the 
colonizing country. Likewise, as the second Hellenic wave resembles the first of the 
West in this respect, so the first Hellenic wave of expansion through the 
establishment of colonies around in the Mediterranean resembles the second Western 
with its colonies around the world. These are of course rough generalizations and in 
each wave we can find traces of the other phenomena too. Yet one of the patterns 
seem to be predominant in each wave.  
 
Second Breakdown 
 
The Second Breakdown is, in the Hellenic case, not as easily defined as the first. 
Does it, for instance, begin with the Wars of the Diadochi (322-275), the wars 
between Alexander’s generals out of which emerged the Hellenistic kingdoms? Does 
it begin with the 1st Punic War (264-241) between Rome and Carthage for the 
dominion over Sicily? It seems fair, I think, to regard these large-scale wars as the 
beginning of the Second Breakdown, since they were waged between the states that 
carried out the Second Wave of Expansion – and continued to carry it out during the 
Hellenistic Period. The most peculiar thing about this is that it places the beginning of 
the Second Breakdown immediately after the first burst (Alexander’s campaign) of 
the Second Wave of Expansion. Perhaps we could instead phrase them ‘the first of 
the wars that led to the Second Breakdown’.  
The height of this breakdown period is more obvious. Surely, this must be 
considered to be the Second Punic War (218-201) where Rome fought for her life 
during 15 long years on Italian soil against Hannibal’s armies – plus its aftermath 
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which ended up engulfing most of the major powers in the Mediterranean in struggles 
with Rome. The end seems also rather easy to determine. It is the Third Punic War 
(149-146) where Rome razes Carthage and Corinth to the ground and emerges as the 
supreme power in the Hellenic Mediterranean world. From then onwards Rome is 
still engaged in numerous wars and continuous slave uprisings but none, it seems fair 
to say, that came close to threatening her dominant position in the Mediterranean as 
Carthage did during the Second Punic War. 
In Europe the Second Breakdown following the Second Wave of Expansion 
seems more clearly discernible. It corresponds to Toynbee’s Wars of Nationality, 
which is his second rout of Western Civilization, and it comes in two turns. The first 
is the wars of Napoleon and a century later the two World Wars. The World Wars 
decisively break the power of the European empires that drove the Second Wave of 
Expansion and almost all of the last of their colonies secede during 1960’s. 
There is the peculiar difference here that the Second Breakdown period in the 
Hellenic case ends with Rome standing supreme. While in the case of The West after 
World War II there emerge two strong contending powers in the world, the US and 
the Soviet Union. If the criterion for the end of the Second Breakdown is that only 
one state remains supreme in the geographical area affected by the civilization, that 
might lead us to place the end of the Second Breakdown of The West in 1991 with 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, I think there are two main reasons that 
it should still be placed at the end of World War II. The first is that the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union happened with no direct confrontation between the two opposing 
powers, but instead due to internal exhaustion in the Soviet Union. It certainly was a 
different case with Rome’s destruction of Carthage in 146 B.C. The second reason is 
the apt parallel between the finality of the destruction in the Third Punic War and 
World War II. As noted in the beginning of this paragraph, the parallel between the 
annihilation of Carthage and Corinth and 21 centuries later Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
is striking. We may also appreciate the fact that, had nuclear weapons not been 
invented, the US would have been unquestioningly superior according to 
conventional military standards and thus already the hegemon during the Cold War 
that it became ‘officially’ after 1991. Finally, we can note that Toynbee does not even 
consider Russia as part of Western Civilization since Orthodox and Catholic 
Christianity split off from one another from early on. Whether Russia should be 
considered part of The West or not may be open for debate, but if we follow Toynbee 
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on this one deciding that Russia is not then it is indisputable that US was the one 
supreme remaining power in The West at the end of World War II and that thus, the 
end of the Second Breakdown should be placed there. 
 
Third Wave of Expansion and Breakdown 
 
The Third Wave of Expansion of Hellenism is carried out by Rome. Rome both 
defeats and integrates areas that were already Hellenized, such as Greece (obviously), 
Macedon, vast areas of the decaying Seleucid Empire and finally Ptolemaic Egypt. 
And she conquers and Hellenizes new areas such as the Iberian Peninsula, and Gaul 
and Britain through Julius Caesar’s campaigns. No one can really stand against Rome 
after 146 B.C. although many try. But with the vast expansion of Roman rule the 
traditional social and political structures of the Roman Republic got stretched, finally 
to a point greater than they could take. In the 1st century B.C. Rome plunged into a 
series of brutal civil wars and social upheavals that I would define as the Third 
Breakdown which ended up destroying the Republic. When Augustus finally restored 
peace in 31 B.C. the Roman society emerged in a new political form, the Principate 
with what was essentially an emperor – or dictator. Roman rule in the Mediterranean 
was now absolute and the Universal State of the Hellenic Civilization had come into 
being.  
There is an important distinction to be made here since Toynbee includes the 
Roman Civil Wars of the 1st century B.C. in his second rout or breakdown of 
Hellenism. That is, he puts the Punic Wars and other related wars of the 2nd century 
B.C. together with the Civil Wars of the 1st century B.C. I believe there is an 
important difference here, since the Punic Wars and the related wars following them 
were conflicts between sovereign states, the states that carried out the Second Wave 
of Expansion of Hellenism. Contrarily, the wars of the 1st century B.C. are primarily 
wars between contending fractions within the Roman Republic itself. That is, along 
with and following the Third Wave of Expansion comes the Third Breakdown, but it 
comes mainly in the form of internal strife since there are no powers left in the 
Hellenic world to seriously threaten Rome. 
As touched upon in the end of chapter 2 the US is the state today that 
continues the expansion of Western Civilization. We have seen and still see this on a 
military level, we see it on the corporate and economic level and we have seen it on 
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the political level through the US contribution and initiative to those international 
institutions that could be interpreted as a form of emerging global governance. It 
seems fair to say that we see it also with still unspent force on the cultural level, given 
the continuous attraction of non-Western peoples to Western culture and lifestyle. As 
mentioned in the paragraph A civilization’s cosmology – function and dynamics in the 
present chapter, one could argue that there were two competing waves of Western 
expansion during the Cold War – since Communism was essentially a Western idea. 
It seems that it may be difficult after all to place Russia either inside or outside 
Western Civilization. In any case, today there surely is only one such wave and it is 
emanating chiefly from the United States. 
If then, the US is playing the role for The West that Rome played for the 
Hellenic Civilization and if that same pattern will recur in some form, then we should 
expect a Third Breakdown some time in the future – perhaps fairly soon. If we count 
from the end of the Second Breakdown that we suggested above to be in 146 B.C. 
and 1945 respectively, then we would be now where the Roman Republic were some 
time in the beginning of the 1st century B.C. when the Social War was raging between 
Rome and those of her Italian allies that had been denied Roman citizenship. Out of 
that conflict emerged the other series of Civil Wars that eventually brought down the 
Republic.  
Now, as should be clear by now, nothing repeats with exactitude in history. 
Such a Third Breakdown could happen in many ways and it could also not happen at 
all. But there are contemporary developments that give reason to worry. It still 
remains a possible scenario that the continuing global financial crisis could develop 
into a global financial meltdown. That would have the potential to trigger a prolonged 
period of uncertainty and instability. In the past, several empires have been brought to 
their knees by a collapse of their currency. 
Summing up, the expansion may occur in different forms from wave to wave 
and from civilization to civilization. Sometimes it may last a bit longer, other times a 
bit shorter. Sometimes it happens primarily through military conquest and 
establishment of independent kingdoms, at other times principally through 
colonization. This suggests that the key aspect to focus upon is exactly expansion 
since whichever way it occurs, it does occur, each time carried out by and resulting in 
fewer and larger political units than the wave preceding it. Thus the multitude of 
Hellenic city-states became the successor-states of Alexander’s generals, which again 
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became The Roman Empire. And the multitude of medieval feudal kingdoms and 
principalities became absorbed by the European colonial powers and nation-states 
which are now becoming ever more integrated into a new global order pioneered and 
driven by the United States. It seems to my mind that the idea of successive waves of 
expansion fits well together with Toynbee’s description of successive breakdowns in 
the Time of Troubles. 
 
 
 
Conclusion: summery of the revised pattern 
 
In this thesis, I have presented the essentials of the Toynbeean system, the growth 
process and the patterns he sees in the Graeco-Roman and Western Civilizations. I 
have presented some of the main factors that shaped Toynbee privately and 
professionally and thus also his magnum opus A Study of History. I have touched 
briefly upon the tradition of Comparative Civilizations that have developed from 
Spengler and Toynbee, and I have considered some of the most notable points of 
critique that have resounded in essays by critical reviewers.  
One of my initial motivations for undertaking this work was a feeling that 
many of these critical essays were focusing on the more extravagant, provocative 
parts and the obvious flaws in Toynbee’s system, thus diverting attention from a 
constructive discussion about the deeper structures of his system. Penetrating the 
smoke of the sometimes heated discussions, I have found that there does indeed seem 
to be an intact structure remaining, a general pattern of development that recurs in the 
Graeco-Roman and Western Civilizations. In other words, much of the levelled 
critique is relevant, but it does not rip apart the system in its entirety – some part of 
the pattern of development seems untouched. In the following I will recount the 
results of my treatment of Toynbee’s system followed by a summary of this revised 
pattern.  
In my discussion of Toynbee’s system I have suggested some re-
conceptualizations of some of his most important terms. For instance, I have 
proposed a more precise definition of the term civilization than Toynbee ever 
produced himself, yet one that – I think – captures the phenomenon in the way he 
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works with it. I have suggested a civilization to be defined by what I call a shared 
cosmology, a religious meta-narrative explaining the purpose and nature of the 
universe and the role and purpose of human beings in that universe. Yet a civilization 
should not be seen as only that which is ‘invisible’ as Toynbee claims in his later 
writings. Instead, I suggest that it is both a shared cosmology and the multitude of 
cultural expressions that are coloured by that cosmology. Such a definition can, I 
believe, reconcile matter and ‘spirit’, civilizations and religions in a way Toynbee 
never managed. 
I have also suggested that when that cosmology begins to break down, there 
originate a number of attempts to either salvage it, create a new cosmology or restore 
unity on the outer political level in the form of a Universal State. I proposed that 
these can be interpreted as attempts to recreate the original unity of the civilization on 
either a cosmological or physical level. The cosmological understanding of a 
civilization that I propose also means that we should include the history of the 
formation of the cosmology in the history of that cosmology’s civilization. In the case 
of The West, for instance, this means adding to our civilization’s history the account 
of the formation of the Christian Catholic Church and worldview. 
I moreover found that a religious cosmology tends to provide a philosophy of 
life that is based on the account of the very nature and purpose of the universe that 
human beings inhabit. In that way, such a cosmology intimately connects the 
individual’s life with a grander vision of the purpose and nature of the cosmos. Thus, 
it provides human beings with a meaningful universe to live in. The modern ‘secular 
cosmology’ of The West, based chiefly on science, cannot provide a meaning on that 
level and I suggested this as one of several possible explanations as to why increasing 
numbers of modern Westerners feel attracted to the religious and spiritual movements 
and cosmologies of The East. 
Regarding the growth of civilizations I have concluded, together with many 
others, that Toynbee’s description of the growth process is far from adequate, but that 
he does illuminate seemingly important aspects of it. Challenge and Response does 
seem like a useful term in many instances, although it cannot account for all cases of 
what ought to be considered growth. I argue for an expansion of Toynbee’s notion of 
growth to include not only developments within the political, economic and social 
fields, but also within the fields of art, thought, science, technology and religion. I 
furthermore distinguish between cultural and civilizational growth; the first being 
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any new creation within the above mentioned fields, the latter being those of such 
developments that succeed to the point of expanding throughout the civilization, 
changing it for good and becoming a common heritage. I think that this distinction 
may serve to reconcile Toynbee and some of his critics who seemed to feel that he 
downplayed many of the important cultural achievements of The West during the 
Modern Period. My point is that he has his gaze fixed on the civilizations and thus 
considers only what I term civilizational growth, while he probably would not deny 
that there occurs lots of cultural growth in all the various fields of human activity 
according to the above made distinction. Concerning possible recurring patterns in 
the growth process I observe that there seems to be a long-term development where 
growth in the various cultural fields at first tends to support and uphold the 
established religious cosmology, whereas later on they gradually detach themselves 
from it and begin to pursue goals of their own. 
Regarding Toynbee’s term Time of Troubles I find that it does seem to 
describe an important development in our two civilizations. It does seem as if there is 
a progression towards ever more large-scale, all-out, brutal wars, where the standard 
of behaviour disintegrates to the point of allowing wholesale destruction of entire 
civilian cities. In this respect, ancient Carthage and Corinth are apt equivalents to 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki of twentieth century. That being said, Time of Troubles also 
seems like an unfairly gloomy term for two periods that also see tremendous cultural 
growth in most of the above mentioned fields and a radical physical expansion of the 
civilizations. I have suggested an alternative model that I call the Expansion-
breakdown-model whereby I attempt to show that both civilizations have expanded in 
a series of three successive waves, each time carried out by and resulting in fewer and 
larger political units than the wave preceding it. Toynbee’s two breakdowns 
occurring during the Time of Troubles fall in between these waves of expansion. 
 
Based on the results of this treatment of Toynbee’s system it seems appropriate to 
summarize what our two civilizations now seem to have in common. First of all, we 
can say that in the life of both Hellenism and The West the cosmology originated 
first, in the form of a religion. The cosmologies of Hellenism and The West 
originated in different ways, Christianity within the Roman Empire and Olympianism 
among the barbarians dismembering the Minoan Civilization. However, both these 
religions had the honour of being the official cosmology in the barbarian successor-
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states that followed the fall of the preceding civilization’s Universal State – 
Christianity in Charlemagne’s Holy Roman Empire and Olympianism in 
Agamemnon’s Mycenean realms.  
After that, both civilizations experience a Dark Age of invasions and general 
chaos and both come out again comprising a multitude of political units in response 
to that chaos. Shortly after this new stability has been achieved both civilizations 
embark on their First Wave of Expansion, Hellenism with the colonies around the 
shores of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea and The West with the Crusades to the 
Holy Land and the Reconquista in Spain. After a couple of centuries this expansion is 
halted by opposition from foreign cultures, seemingly contributing to internal strife 
within the civilization.  
After some centuries both civilizations experience what might be termed as a 
growing dissension or crack within their cosmologies, Hellenism with estrangement 
developing between the way of life of Athens and Sparta, The West with the 
Protestant Reformation. Both of these growing fissures contribute to the wars of the 
First Breakdown, which in Hellenism culminates with the Peloponnesian War and in 
The West with the Thirty Years War. At this time, there are also the first tendencies 
of reason beginning to detach itself from the original religious cosmology and 
increasingly attempting to make sense of the universe on its own. The cultural growth 
within the fields of art, architecture and philosophy, that before supported, upheld and 
expanded the religious cosmology now gradually begins to work in other directions. 
Some, like science, actively dismembering the religious cosmology and in time 
erecting one of its own.  
Out of the debris of the First Breakdown the Second Wave of Expansion 
occurs, carried out by and resulting in fewer and larger political units than the wave 
preceding it. These are Alexander’s conquests in The East and his generals’ 
successor-states and to some extent Rome, and they are the maritime colonial empires 
of The West. Both civilizations then experience a Second Breakdown through several 
brutal all-out wars, in Hellenism beginning perhaps with the Wars of The Diadochi 
between Alexander’s generals and the First Punic War and ending with the Third 
Punic War. In the case of The West the Second Breakdown begins with the 
Napoleonic Wars and ends with World War II.  
After the Second Breakdown one state is left supreme, Rome in Hellenism 
and the United States in The West (two in The West if we consider Russia as part of 
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The West) which now embark on the Third Wave of Expansion. In Hellenism this 
third wave continues into the Third Breakdown, which mostly takes the form of civil 
wars, social upheaval and change of the political system since there are no other 
states left in the Mediterranean to seriously match Rome. Out of that Third 
Breakdown emerges the Hellenic Universal State in the form of the Roman Empire. 
In the case of The West we are perhaps now seeing the beginning of the Third 
Breakdown with the global financial crisis and consequent social disruption.  
 
 
 
Final thoughts 
 
There are many further perspectives one could explore on the basis of a thesis like 
this, many new directions that could be taken. First and foremost, it seems necessary 
to say that all of the perspectives discussed here could of course be treated in much 
greater detail. Though not the norm in academic work, I have chosen, much in 
Toynbee’s style, to illuminate a greater number of parts in order to, hopefully, shed 
light on their connections in the greater picture. This is clearly at the cost of the 
number of details illuminated in each part, but exactly because most academic work 
on Toynbee tends to focus – often with great results – on one particular part of his 
system, life or intellectual development, I have chosen to take a more synoptic view. 
As far as I am aware, no other writer has undertaken the task of seriously exploring 
whether there remains an intact structure somewhere in Toynbee’s knocked about 
system. And I reasoned that a somewhat broad approach would be most useful in that 
investigation. 
I shall be the first to conclude that that task is far from finished. It is only just 
begun here. As mentioned, each concept and process treated in this thesis could be 
dealt with in far greater detail. It ought to be in the future. If the basic structure of the 
argument is accepted, it would also remain to investigate the similarities and 
dissimilarities between the 1st century B.C. Graeco-Roman world and the 21st century 
Western. Would such a study support the idea of the existence of a recurring pattern 
or would it undermine it? And how should such an assessment be carried out, what 
should qualify as similarities and what should not? When that has been determined, 
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how many similarities must there be before we can reasonably speak of the existence 
of a pattern? The questions are plentiful.  
Even if the project may seem daunting I believe it has a purpose. Toynbee 
never claimed to have found the truth of history, instead he said that he had 
investigated just one of its patterns ”... just as, in dissecting an organism, you can 
throw light on its nature by laying bare either the skeleton or the muscles or the 
nerves or the blood circulation. (...) I should be well content if it turned out that I had 
laid bare one genuine facet of history.”76 He also justified his project by saying that it 
was an imperative need of his time to try to make sense of history.  
I think he has a point, and a point that is still relevant today. Human beings 
need a sense of knowing where they come from, they need a ‘History’ that makes 
sense. Nietzsche observed over a hundred years ago that such a history serves life. It 
gives life a horizon – a cosmology we might say – within which to exist. It gives 
identity and perhaps an idea of where one is going. Not just as individuals, but also as 
society, as humanity. It can give a certain mental robustness that could prove a vital 
ally for many people in the time of continuously accelerating change in which we 
live. 
This of course does not mean that we should tell each other grand and lofty 
stories just because we need something to believe in. That would seem like a reversal 
of some of the greatest achievements of our civilization. Yet it is crucial to perceive 
that our world is made up of stories, each of them making sense of its own little piece 
of reality. Sometimes, once or twice in a generation, someone comes along who feels 
an compelling urge to tell a grand narrative, that all the little stories may be fitted 
into. Toynbee was clearly one of these people. It is an ungrateful task as the score of 
criticism show. But they have to try and we have to wrestle and wrangle with their 
stubborn visions. We need to tear them apart and put them together again, in new and 
ever more creative and mysterious forms. Out of that melting pot sometimes, very 
rarely, a new grand narrative is born. One that may last a millennium and birth a 
civilization. Luckily we can only guess when that may be.  
 
 
 
                                                
76 McNeill, p. 224. 
 85 
Abstract 
 
The thesis is a discussion of the view of history set forth by Arnold Joseph Toynbee 
(1889-1975) in his 12-volume A Study of History, published in 1934-61. The thesis 
presents the private and professional influences that shaped Toynbee and his view of 
history, e.g. his relationship with Oswald Spengler, and it presents the parts of 
Toynbee’s philosophy of history that deals with the Graeco-Roman and Western 
Civilizations. Toynbee detected a recurring pattern in the development of these two 
civilizations that places current Western Civilization at a point of development 
roughly equivalent to that of the Graeco-Roman Civilization in the 1st century B.C.  
Many reviewers have attacked Toynbee’s system and pointed to flaws in its 
method and conclusions. I present and discuss some of this critique and conclude that 
much of it is fair and reasonable, yet that it does not seem to impinge on the general 
structure of his system, such as the very idea of focusing on civilizations and the 
larger phases they go through. These parts seem to remain largely intact. I note that 
many reviewers have focused on the more ‘extravagant’ parts of Toynbee’s system, 
for instance his differing interpretations of the value of certain historical actors and 
processes, which has diverted attention from a careful discussion of which parts of his 
system remain sound. The present thesis is meant to contribute to that discussion.  
In chapter 3, I discuss three parts of the Toynbeean system. I investigate more 
closely the term ‘civilization’ and conclude that Toynbee is not consistent in his use 
of it. I then propose to define a civilization by what I call a shared cosmology, a set of 
myths that explain the purpose and nature of the universe and the role of human 
beings in that universe. The defining cosmology in both civilizations came in the 
form of a religion, and it seems to me that this definition captures the phenomenon 
‘civilization’ in the way Toynbee works with it.  
Secondly, I investigate Toynbee’s notion of the ‘growth of civilizations’ and 
conclude, along with many others, that Toynbee’s description of the growth process 
is far from adequate, but that his main term Challenge and Response does indeed 
seem useful in explaining many instances of growth. I suggest a new definition of 
growth and a distinction between cultural and civilizational growth, which I believe 
may clear up some of the controversy over the concept. Finally, I conclude that 
Toynbee’s term Time of Troubles does seem generally useful and that it seems to fit 
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into a larger pattern whereby the civilization expands physically through three 
successive waves, each time carried out by fewer and larger political units than the 
wave preceding it. This leads towards the civilization being united under one political 
framework, Toynbee’s Universal State. 
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